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Traditional models of tax evasion cannot explain why most people comply with 
their taxes. It has been proposed that taxpayers may have an intrinsic motivation (or 
willingness) to comply with taxes – Tax Morale. Empirical studies found that trusting 
government, upholding religious beliefs, and supporting democratic regimes, increase 
individual Tax Morale. Based on those results and drawing from related literature in 
Political Science, this study tests the role of trusting government institutions delivering 
public goods to taxpayers, ideological beliefs, individual support for political regimes, 
and upholding post-materialist values, on Tax Morale. Results for individuals living in 
democratic countries show a positive relationship between trust in government 
institutions and upholding democratic values on Tax Morale; a negative relationship 
between upholding ideological (conservative) beliefs and Tax Morale, and no 
relationship between upholding post-materialist values and Tax Morale. Results for 
individuals living under non-democratic regimes differ in some respects; whereas support 
for democracy is related with higher Tax Morale, other results – trust in government and 
ideological beliefs – differ from theoretical expectations. Overall, higher trust in 
government increases willingness to comply with taxes, and support for democracy elicits 








 The question of why people pay taxes has been asked since taxes were first 
levied; however, the answers have changed over time. Economists use the model 
developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) based on the economics of crime approach 
(Becker, 1968, 1974). In a nutshell, the model posits that individuals would evade taxes 
as long as the payoff from tax evasion outweighs the costs of being caught evading. 
Therefore, increasing the costs of tax cheating – increased audits and stiffer penalties for 
non-compliance – would reduce tax evasion. 
 Despite its simplicity and clear-cut policy predictions, the model has fallen short 
of explaining why observed levels of tax compliance (in experiments and empirical 
studies) are higher than theoretical predictions. That has prompted the search for 
alternative models that may better capture the complexity of tax compliant behavior 
(Alm, 1999). 
 One aspect ignored by the neoclassical model of tax evasion (as it is sometimes 
called) is the role of individual attitudes towards compliance with taxes. Theoretical 
models have been developed that explicitly include individual attitudes (e.g. 
Schnellenbach, 2006) or social conventions and norms (Cullings and Lewis, 1997) to 
explain individual tax compliance decisions. The existence of a willingness to comply 
with taxes - Tax Morale – has been proposed to explain individual attitudes towards tax 
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compliance; it has been defined as the intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes (Torgler 
2003a, b)  
 Empirical research on the factors affecting Tax Morale has produced some 
consistent results, 
1. Individuals who trust government are more likely to report higher Tax Morale 
than those who do not trust it, 
2. Individuals upholding religious values are more likely to exhibit higher 
motivation to comply with taxes, 
3. Individuals who support democracy are more likely to show willingness to 
comply with their taxes, 
4. Older individuals are more likely to have higher Tax Morale than younger 
ones. 
 Before proceeding further, I should point out that a limitation of those results is 
that research linking Tax Morale and tax compliance behavior has lagged behind (Halla, 
2010 ), and that the work I plan to carry out is not addressing this issue. One possible 
reason for that deficiency is data availability. Because of the illegal nature of tax evasion, 
data on individual tax evasion is difficult to obtain - even when considering the data 
needs of the neoclassical model. Therefore, getting data that also includes individual 
attitudes towards tax compliance may be even more difficult. A handful of studies that 
have used survey data (Wenzel 2005, Braithwaite, Reinhart and Smar, 2010) and 
behavioral experiments (Bosco & Mittone, 1997) have produced insights suggesting the 
existence of a link between tax compliance attitudes and tax compliance behavior. 
 3
 Using those findings as a starting point, I seek to deepen the understanding of the 
factors that shapes individual willingness to comply with taxes. For instance, we know 
that trusting governments affects Tax Morale but we do not know with detail what 
government does that affects individual trust. Similarly, the role of religious beliefs on 
Tax Morale has been recognized in the literature, but other beliefs that may be as 
important ideology has not received the same attention. Moreover, there are some 
reservations regarding the measures used to gauge certain concepts such as individual 
support for democracy (Inglehart, 2003). In addressing those concerns, it will be helpful 
to broaden the theoretical foundations by borrowing from work done in other social 
sciences on related topics, e.g. trust in political institutions, justice and fairness, and trust 
and cooperation among individuals. Therefore, using findings 1 through 4 as a starting 
point, four revised hypotheses will be developed and tested, 
1. Trust in Government and Tax Morale. I propose that governments increase 
individual Tax Morale when government organizations that interact directly 
with citizens in the delivery of public goods and services treat individuals with 
fairness and impartiality. 
2. Individual beliefs. In addition to religious beliefs, I hypothesize that an 
individual’s ideological positions would affect his/her Tax Morale. 
3. Support for Democracy and Tax Morale. Based on the finding that individuals 
who support democracy are more likely to report Tax Morale, I will propose 
the hypothesis that when the political regime in place matches individual 
preferences, individuals who uphold those preferences are more likely to 
report Tax Morale. 
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4. I will propose that lower Tax Morale of some individuals may be part of a 
process of societal value. Specifically, I will use the post-materialist value 
change hypothesis developed by Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart, 1971, Inglehart 
and Abramson, 1999) that posits that individual values are shaped by the 
environment experienced during their formative years. 
 Table 1.1 below summarizes the findings in the literature on Tax Morale and the 
proposed hypotheses that will be developed in the coming chapters. 
 
 
Table 1.1 Tax Morale Findings and Proposed Hypotheses 
Findings Proposed Hypotheses 
Trust in Government increases Tax Morale Tax Morale is affected by government 
action when delivering public goods and 
services to individuals (output side of 
government)  
Upholding religious beliefs increases Tax 
Morale 
Ideological beliefs affect tax Morale 
Individual support for Democracy 
increases Tax Morale  
Individuals whose individual regime 
preferences are reflected in the current 
regime are more likely to report Tax 
Morale. 
Older individuals exhibit higher Tax 
Morale 
Older individuals may uphold different 





 The plan for the upcoming chapters is the following, 
 Chapter 2 discusses the limitations of the Neoclassical Model of Tax Evasion 
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 Chapter 3 introduces some of the alternative models of tax compliance, reviews 
Tax Morale in detail, and lays out the basic themes to be developed into hypotheses in 
chapter 4 
 Chapter 4 develops the four proposed hypotheses 
 Chapter 5 presents the empirical model –data and methods, variables and 
expectations about results. 
 Chapter 6 presents the results of testing the empirical model introduced in chapter 
5 
 Chapter 7 discusses the results of the previous chapter, their policy implications, 
and points out some areas of future interest 
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The question of why people pay taxes has been asked from the beginnings of 
taxation although explanations amenable to empirical testing had to wait much longer. 
The conventional starting point for the literature on tax evasion comes from the model 
developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (henceforth named neoclassical model of 
tax evasion), which extended the economics of crime framework developed by Becker 
(1968, 1974) to the field of taxation. Taxpayers comply with taxes based on a cost-benefit 
calculation weighing the benefits derived from evading taxes v. the costs of being caught 
cheating. The model’s policy predictions are straightforward; increased control 
(taxpayers’ audits) and higher penalties for tax cheating would lower tax evasion. 
The neoclassical model of tax evasion is an appealing theoretical proposition 
because of its simplicity and straightforward policy prescriptions. However, that 
simplicity has come with the price of undermining its ability to explain observed tax 
compliant behavior. More specifically, I will highlight five issues that limit the model’s 
empirical appeal, 
1. Observed levels of tax compliance exceed those predicted by the neoclassical 
model; given the levels of audits and fines in practice 
2. Exclusive reliance on incentives - command and control strategies - may 
crowd out individual motivation to comply voluntarily with taxes 
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3. The behavioral assumptions of  the neoclassical model of tax evasion conflicts 
with the conception of individuals upheld by democracy 
4. The neoclassical model assumes that exists a clear and objective demarcation 
between compliant and non-compliant behavior, which may not be the case in 
practice 
5. The neoclassical model assumes tax officials behave in ways that contradict 
the economic principle of self-interest 
 The first two issues have been thoroughly discussed in the Tax Compliance 
literature. The third issue addresses the topic of voluntary tax compliance but from a 
political environment perspective. The fourth one uses the well-known phenomenon of 
Creative Tax Compliance in a novel way1 to illustrate that a clear separation between 
legal and illegal behavior – unlike theoretical expectations - may be unclear even for tax 
enforcement. The last observation highlights the unexplained contradiction in the 
neoclassical model between constructing taxpayers according to the assumptions of 
Economics and at the same time denying those principles in its characterization of tax 
officials. 
 
2.2 Predicted versus Observed Tax Compliance 
 
Empirical studies testing the impact of audits and penalties on tax evasion have 
been extensively conducted. The overall conclusion is that observed levels of tax 
                                                 
 
 
1 To the best of my knowledge, I have not found references in the Tax Compliance literature that used 
Creative Tax Compliance to provide evidence that contradicts the basic tenets of the neoclassical model of 
tax evasion. 
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compliance are much higher than theoretical predictions derived from audit and fine rates 
alone (Alm, 1999, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992, Frey, 2003). 
Different reasons have been offered to explain that finding but subsequent work 
has undermined its relevance. For instance, one reason offered was that high risk aversion 
was raising compliance beyond the model’s predictions – individuals considered 
sanctions more likely than they really were. However, later studies revealed that for that 
explanation to be true the estimated coefficients for risk aversion had to be set up to 
unrealistic levels given the available evidence (Schnellenbach, 2006). 
Another argument proposed to explain the observed levels of tax compliance was 
that the real extent of tax evasion is not fully captured by the data. With tax evasion being 
an illegal activity, tax evaders have every incentive to hide it. However, evidence 
produced by experimental studies has confirmed that tax compliance is higher than 
predicted by deterrence and punishment alone. Experiments allow for a tighter control of 
the factors that affect tax evasion decisions– such as audit and penalty rates. Two 
experimental results are quite remarkable; first, some tax compliance is observed even 
when the probability of detecting those evading taxes is zero. Second, some tax evasion is 
observed even when compliance with taxes can be fully enforced (Alm, McClelland, and 
Schulze, 1992). 
What empirical and experimental results show is that taxpayer behavior may not 
fit well within the boundaries of the neoclassical model of tax evasion and its underlying 
economics of crime approach. Some individuals always cheat regardless of sanctions and 
some always comply (Bird, 2004); some others comply with taxes behaving as if they 
over-weigh low probabilities of detection while others appear to be risk-seeking. Some 
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individuals sometimes behave cooperatively while at times acting as free-riders; some 
individuals seem to be guided by social norms and notions of equity (Alm, McClelland, 
and Schulze, 1992, Alm, 1999). Given the multiplicity of observed behaviors and the 
difficulties in effectively monitoring tax compliance it may not be surprising that some 
call tax compliance “quasi voluntary” (Levi, 1998) Indeed, the new approach to increase 
voluntary tax compliance makes a central postulate to encourage taxpayers to voluntarily 
comply with their taxes (Braithwaite, 2003a, Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). 
To summarize, the neoclassical model of tax evasion has fallen short of 
explaining observed levels of tax compliance by predicting higher tax evasion than 
empirical and experimental studies have revealed. Moreover, the variety of behaviors 
exhibited by individuals regarding their compliance with taxes suggests that the 
neoclassical model of tax evasion may be too narrowly defined to capture such diversity. 
 
2.3 Behavioral Assumptions and Voluntary Tax Compliance 
 
A second criticism of the neoclassical model of tax evasion is its sole reliance on 
threats and coercion to induce tax compliance. There are two different aspects to that 
critique. First, it takes considerable resources to monitor taxpayer compliance, especially 
when there is no third-party information to check the accuracy of taxpayers’ tax filings 
(e.g. income of self-employed individuals). Scarcity of material and human resources is 
more acute in developing and transitional countries where at the same time there are more 
needs for government revenue to alleviate extreme poverty and inequalities; in those 
cases, it would be more cost-effective to deploy those scarce resources where the largest 
yields - recovered revenues or potential for tax evasion - may be realized and develop 
 10
other strategies to improve tax compliance for the rest of the taxpayer population, e.g. 
voluntary tax compliance (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). 
Second, exclusive reliance in deterrence and punishment to increase tax 
compliance risks undermining taxpayers’ own motivation to comply with taxes (Frey, 
2003), 
“…trust breeds trust…” (Feld and Frey, 2007). 
 
Evidence from social Psychology and behavioral Economics shows that control 
and mistrust undermines compliance and cooperation among those being controlled and 
mistrusted. For instance, experimental evidence shows that exclusive reliance on 
sanctions and norms to create and sustain cooperation crowds out cooperation learning 
(Ostrom, 2000b). Moreover, a consistent predictor of a person’s willingness to cooperate 
with others is being a recipient of another person’s trust (Zak, Kurzban, and Matzner, 
2005), whereas individuals who experience betrayal of their trust expectations end up 
withholding cooperation (Baumgartner et al, 2008). Those results are consistent with the 
finding that fairness and cooperation among individuals – besides material outcomes – 
are rewarding (Tabibnia and Lieberman, 2007) 
An insidious shortcoming of using incentives to induce individual tax compliance 
is that authorities’ choice of incentives gives taxpayers a good representation about how 
authorities see them. Bowles (2008) reviewed several experiments dealing with the role 
of incentives on individual performance, finding that the use of incentives undermined 
performance. Those findings were observed even when the incentives were chosen to 
maximize individual payoffs; individuals adjusted their behavior to punish the principal’s 
lack of trust in the agents - even at a cost for them. He concluded that material interest 
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and moral sentiments may not be separable as economists have customarily assumed. 
Therefore, if tax authorities treat taxpayers according to the recommendations of the 
neoclassical model of tax evasion and control their compliance via incentives, individuals 
will read the authorities’ lack of trust in them and undermine taxpayers’ own willingness 
to comply. A downward spiral of lower tax compliance and increasing control to sustain 
tax compliance is the most likely outcome. 
Perhaps the best summary for the role of incentives on shaping individual 
behavior was provided by Tyler (2006), 
“…people are not influenced simply by the possession and use of power. 
Those authorities who seek to lead groups through incentives and/or 
coercion find it difficult to shape behavior effectively through these 
mechanisms, and they have difficult creating and maintaining their 
influence over others…” (p. 393) 
 
To summarize, there is substantial evidence that exclusive use of incentives to 
reduce tax evasion may lead to lower tax compliance because of crowding out taxpayers’ 
own willingness to comply with taxes. In turn, reduced tax compliance would force 
government to exercise even more control to keep revenues from falling, which will lead 
to additional declines in individual voluntary compliance, and so on. 
  
2.4 Behavioral Assumptions and Democracy 
 
The neoclassical model of tax evasion assumes individuals as willing to engage in 
illegal behavior if the expected payoff of doing it exceeds the payoff provided by other 
alternative activities (Becker 1974, p. 9). In principle, there would be no problem with 
this conceptualization of individuals as long as it is empirically verifiable; however, that 
 12
the available evidence suggests there is a distance between theoretical predictions and 
observed behaviors. 
There is another aspect in which those behavioral assumptions are problematic 
and that happens when those assumptions conflict with the behavioral assumptions 
sustaining democratic regimes. Under democracy, individuals enjoy a wide array of 
freedoms and rights that are uphold by governments. Some of those fundamental rights 
are the right to elect those who would rule and becoming aspirants running for public 
office. Those rights are the result of assuming individuals as mature and responsible, and 
capable of keeping up to their promises and commitments. If individuals are just 
prospective norm breakers - as the neoclassical model of tax evasion posits - they would 
likewise decide to run for office and benefit from what it has to offer in terms of private 
rewards. Alternatively, they would vote for those who would let them to transgress as 
many norms without punishment as possible. Democracy in that case should be an 
impossible utopia. Because advanced democracies have avoided such a fate, what needs 
to be explained is not why there are criminals, but instead why so many individuals 
observe the norms (Frey, 1997). 
A more concrete illustration of the clash of conceptions involves considering what 
happens when individuals meet tax authorities. Treating taxpayers as suspicious cheaters 
– as hypothesized by the neoclassical model - undermines their status as citizens of 
democratic state because, among those rights that individuals enjoy is the presumption of 
being not guilty until proven otherwise (Freedom House, 2011). In turn, that clash would 
impact how individuals would react towards the state; tax compliance would fall because 
individuals comply with their taxes responding to how authorities treat them (Feld and 
 13
Frey, 2002, 2007). If taxpayers are treated in ways that undermine achieving a high level 
of consensus about government actions, taxpayers would respond by using whatever 
means available to evade taxes (Frey, 2003). 
The effects of treating individuals as prospective criminals undermine 
governments’ legitimacy and individual willingness to collaborate with them. 
Bureaucrats who regard individuals as suspicious of cheating on norms would make them 
more resistant of authorities such as law enforcement (Sunshine and Tyler 2003) and less 
likely to cooperate with authorities in general (De Cremer and Tyler 2007). They 
contended that unfair treatment received from government officials undermine individual 
identification with governmental and societal norms; the treatment received from 
government bureaucrats tells individuals they do not belong to the same group than those 
officials (De Cremer, Tyler, and der Ouden, 2005). Unfair treatment at the hands of 
government officials – by taking place where individual well-being is at stake 
(Rohrschneider, 2005) will lower individuals’ willingness to comply with norms in 
general). What seems to be missing is a behavioral concept of individual as a social being 
that is born in a social environment that it is not only not imposed upon the individual, 
but also necessary in their successful development (Simon, 1991) 
To summarize, conflicting conceptions of the individual between those of 
democracy and the classical model of tax evasion may affect not only tax compliance but 
compliance with norms in general. Individuals living in well-established democracies that 
are treated by tax authorities in ways consistent with the economics-of-crime approach 
are expected to show a declined willingness to comply with their taxes.  Taxpayers would 
read  from the treatment received from tax officials that they are seen as untrustworthy 
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(Bowles, 2008) and would adjust their behavior accordingly, increasing resistance to 
cooperate and submit to authorities’ decisions – among them, to comply with their taxes. 
 
2.5 Legal versus Illegal Behavior. Creative Tax Compliance 
 
The neoclassical model of tax evasion assumes that tax evasion is the result of 
individual calculation between benefits of tax evasion v. costs of being caught cheating 
on one’s taxes. This assertion rests on two implicit assumptions; first, that tax norms 
establish a clear and explicit boundary between tax-compliant and non-compliant 
behavior. Second, that everybody bound to comply with tax norms see them in exactly 
the same way. If both assumptions are met, tax non-compliance is the result of individual 
willingness to violate those norms. Unfortunately, that cannot be assumed to be the 
general case. 
First, human rationality is not omniscient but limited. There is a difference 
between the real world and the subjective representation of it inside individuals’ minds 
(Simon, 1978,,1986). As a result, norm compliance errors may not be ruled out as a 
possible cause for tax non-compliant behavior; tax laws are complex and require a 
minimum level of personal qualification that several individuals do not meet (Hofmann, 
Hoelzl, and Kirchler, 2008). Similarly, eventual breaks in individual will to comply with 
taxes may occur even when individuals are convinced about the fairness of the tax code; 
individual action is not driven exclusively by thought but also by emotion and habit 
(Braithwaite 2003c). Punishing all compliance errors as if they were tax cheating would 
make individuals resentful of authorities and negatively affect their willingness to comply 
with taxes. 
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In the same way that tax norms are interpreted and may lead to unintentional tax 
non-compliance, tax norm interpretation may be a legitimate way to reduce one’s tax 
liability. However, tax norm interpretation may also be done with the purpose of 
exploiting norm uncertainty, complying with the letter of tax norms but undermining 
their intentions (Barker, 2009). That phenomenon is identified in the Tax Compliance 
literature as Creative Tax Compliance, 
“…the essence of creative compliance is that it escapes the intended 
impact of law...finding ways to accomplish compliance with the letter of 
the law while totally undermining the policy behind the words…when 
compliance takes the form of creative compliance…it becomes, for those 
vested with the task of enforcing policy, a problem not a 
solution…creative compliance will be found in any area of law in which 
those subject to it have the motivation and the resources (in terms of 
money and/or know-how) to resist legal control legally...” (McBarnet 
2003, p. 230) 
 
Creative Tax Compliance makes the distinction between compliant and cheating 
tax behavior imprecise and equivocal. A practical illustration of the difficulties of 
separating legal from illegal tax behavior comes from a case that took place in Australia 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s that has been documented with detail (Murphy, 
2004, Braithwaite, Murphy, and Reinhart, 2007). Briefly stated, a group of Australian 
taxpayers invested in so-called tax effective schemes that provided taxpayers with sizable 
tax deductions. The attitude of the Australian Tax Office (ATO) shows that uncertainty 
about tax norms and taxpayer behavior intentions also reaches those in charge of 
enforcing the tax code. They initially processed the tax returns and granted those tax 
deductions. However, by mid-1998 the ATO made a 180 degree turn; they disallowed all 
the previously accepted tax returns and instead went after those taxpayers that had 
received tax breaks (about 42,000) to collect not only past due taxes but also interests and 
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penalties. The ATO justified its change in attitude contending that the investment 
schemes’ only purpose was of obtaining tax deductions, distorting the tax code’s original 
intention of promoting investment. Affected taxpayers actively resisted the authorities’ 
decisions claiming that those schemes had been sold to them by professionals to legally 
minimize tax liability. They lodged complaints before the Ombudsman and started 
organizing to litigate against the tax administration while refusing to pay the disputed 
taxes and penalties2. The controversy escalated – despite the relatively minor number of 
taxpayers involved – receiving broad attention in the press going all the way up to the 
national parliament. By 2002 the tax authorities backtracked several of their claims 
offering instead settlements with taxpayers where a grace period to pay past due taxes 
was offered and dropping tax penalties and interests; interestingly, those settlements were 
not offered to the financial advisors who sold those tax investment schemes to investors 
thus implicitly acknowledging that taxpayers might have been duped by unscrupulous 
advisors (Braithwaite, Murphy, and Reinhart 2007, 143). 
The illustration provides a practical lesson on how difficult may be to draw an 
objective, clear-cut separation between compliant and non-compliant behavior. Instead, 
differences or deficiencies about how tax norms are interpreted may be at the root of 
some observed non-compliance situations. Whether those non-compliant situations are 
the result of taxpayers’ ability (or capacity) to understand the tax norms, a legitimate 
attempt at reducing one’s tax liability, or the result of skillful twisting of the tax code 
undermining the legislators’ intentions when drafting the code, may be difficult to 
                                                 
 
 
2 More than 50% of those taxpayers had rejected setting their tax cases with the tax administration as late as 
2002. 
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determine. In fact, it is not unusual that what the Tax Codes establish as permissible of 
forbidden has to be decided before the Courts by judges that seek to untangle the 
legislators’ intentions when writing the statute. Therefore, the assumption that an 
objective separation between tax compliance and tax evasion always exist – as implicitly 
assumed in the neoclassical model – does not necessarily hold in practice. 
 
2.6. Behavioral Assumptions of Tax Officials 
 
One of the most problematic features of the neoclassical model of tax evasion is 
the way that taxpayers and tax authorities are portrayed. Whereas taxpayers are assumed 
as self-interested, evading on their taxes as long as the payoff is beneficial to them, tax 
officials – instead of their own self-interest – are assumed to pursue government’s 
interests (or the common good) by searching for and sanctioning tax cheaters. 
Unfortunately, there is no explanation about why tax officials are assumed to be different 
from taxpayers. Thus, it would be interesting to may speculate on what would happen if 
both taxpayers and tax officials are only driven by their own self-interest - as Economics 
customarily assumes for economic agents. 
When catching a taxpayer in a tax cheating situation, a tax official is faced with a 
choice; report the violation and the penalties for non-compliance go to the government 
coffers, or manage to extract some side payment from the taxpayer in exchange for 
leaving the situation unreported. In doing so, the tax official weighs the costs of reporting 
(not getting extra income) versus the costs of extracting side payments and not reporting 
tax cheaters (being caught himself and in turn being either penalized or bribed in 
exchange for being left off the hook). 
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Lifting the assumption that tax authorities are incorruptible pursuers of the 
common good has changed the tax evasion game from a risky gambling to an uncertain 
one. The decision of whether to cheat or comply with taxes no longer depends on 
deterrence and punishment but also on what taxpayers expect about others’ actions 
regarding tax evasion. If the taxpayer believes most individuals would cheat on their 
taxes and be able to get away with it by paying bribes, then he may decide to cheat too 
taxes. On the contrary, if he believes others mostly comply with their legal obligations to 
pay taxes and enforce tax laws, he may decide it is better to pay our taxes. 
One logical counter-argument is that by applying harsher penalties and heavier 
oversight of both taxpayers and those monitoring their compliance may reduce those 
incentives to cheat. However, the issue is who will apply those penalties since he has 
nothing to gain from it. In general, when non-compliance is the expected behavior 
harsher penalties and heavier oversight will be mostly ineffective because there would be 
no one willing to enforce them (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010). Moreover, 
enacting harsher penalties for non-compliance and failing to enforce them would 
reinforce individual perceptions that non-compliance with norms cannot be eradicated or 
reduced thus further undermining compliance among those who still comply (Ostrom, 
1998); nobody wants to be a “sucker” that plays by the rules when nobody plays by them 
(Levi, 1998, Rothstein, 2005) 
To conclude, the neoclassical model shows the problematic feature that, in order 
for it to work it has to assume behavior from tax officials that contradicts the basic tenets 
of homo economicus. When the assumption is lifted, the role of expectations about what 
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others do regarding compliance with tax norms become a part of the decision to cheat or 




The neoclassical model of tax evasion is a simple and elegant way of thinking 
about tax compliance. However, the model falls short in several respects and some of its 
features are problematic. First, it predicts higher tax evasion than observed. Second, its 
conception of individual behavior is not suitable with that of modern democracies; where 
both collide it would make individuals less compliant with their taxes, government norms 
and authority. Third, its reliance on sanctions and controls to reduce tax evasion crowds 
out autonomous tax compliance behavior making individuals less (and not more) 
compliant with taxes and formal rules. Finally, the tax code does not always provide an 
objective separation between legal and illegal behavior; in addition to individuals making 
mistakes in interpreting tax norms, the phenomenon of creative compliance challenges 
the very nature of what tax norms define as admissible behaviors -taxpayers may seek to 
comply with the letter of the law but undermining their intentions. 
The table below summarizes the main points made about the Neoclassical Model 







Table 2.1. Neoclassical Model of Tax Evasion 
Advantages Limitations 
Simple 
Clear and testable predictions 
Observed levels of tax compliance are far 
higher than theoretical  
 “Model of man” contradicts conception of 
man under democracy 
• Undermines individual compliance 
with government norms 
“Punishment and Control” approach 
crowds out voluntary tax compliance 
 Objective demarcation between legal and 
illegal behavior is not possible because 
norms interpretation is subjective 
• Involuntary compliance errors 
• Creative tax compliance 
Discrepancy between characterization of 
taxpayers and tax enforcement officials 
• Taxpayers are self-interested, but 




The assessment of the neoclassical model would not be complete without mention 
to the policy implications. One important lesson is that that suggesting “one-size-fits-all’ 
taxation policies to elicit individual compliance – e.g. sole reliance on deterrence and 
punishment – may seem at times problematic and even counterproductive. 
Recent efforts in tax administration reform in developed and developing countries 
have followed on a broader strategy of making tax administration and tax enforcement 
consistent with democratic principles, 
“…in return for taxes, taxpayers should not only receive goods and 
services, but also sound governance that is respectful and protective of 
democratic principles and processes…” (Braithwaite, 2003b) 
 
Consistent with that overall objective, tax reform has focused on eliciting 
voluntary tax compliance by building a relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities 
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based on respect and trust (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). In order to do that, tax 
reforms have sought to endow tax administrations with means to help taxpayers to fulfill 
better and more easily their tax duties, developing codes of conduct for taxpayers and tax 
officials, applying transparent procedures on taxpayers consistently, and giving taxpayers 
the opportunity to appeal tax administration decisions before independent bodies. Those 
elements of tax reform have been present in cases as disparate as Australia (Braithwaite, 
2003a), Bulgaria (World Bank, 2003) and Kazhakstan (World Bank, 2008). 
The next chapter will introduce some alternative models of tax compliance, 
presents Tax Morale, and review its findings, and the issues that will lead to the 
formulation of the hypotheses to be developed and tested in the coming chapters. 
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The chapter will review a few models of tax compliance that diverge in 
substantial ways from the neoclassical model of tax evasion, and then introduce and 
discuss Tax Morale and its findings. 
 
3.1. Alternative Models: the Role of Norms 
 
One feature shared by those alternative models is that researchers’ interest shifted 
away from explaining tax evasion, instead seeking to understand what influences people 
to comply with taxes. Another shared feature is abandoning the assumption that tax 
compliance is based on individual decision-making towards analyzing, formalizing, and 
testing the role that social and individual norms play on tax compliance. In fact, those 
features developed contemporary to the neoclassical model of tax evasion developed by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972); interest in norms and individual morality as influencing 
tax compliance started at least in the 1970s or earlier (Torgler, 2003b). I will now provide 
a brief account of work done regarding the role of individual and social norms in tax 
compliance, and then move to consider in detail what affects individual attitudes towards 
compliance with taxes –Tax Morale. 
The first model to introduce is the “heuristic” approach to tax compliance (Scholz 
and Pinney 1995, Scholz and Lubell, 1998a, b) which hypothesizes two different 
heuristic mechanisms affecting individual tax compliance. One is the “duty” heuristic; 
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individuals over-estimate the likelihood of getting caught because cheating violates their 
sense of duty; as a result, taxpayer estimations of the probability of being caught cheating 
are biased upwards. Scholz and Pinney (1995) tested it empirically and found that the 
probability of being caught was influenced more by duty factors than by objective 
deterrence factors. The other mechanism is the “trust” heuristic (Scholz and Lubell 
1998a) and contends that individuals would be willing to pay their taxes when they trust 
government and trust other citizens to pay their fair share of taxes. Empirical results 
revealed that higher levels of trust lowered the likelihood of individual non-compliance 
even after controlling for deterrence factors. No further work along those lines has been 
identified, possibly because of data issues preventing additional work along those lines. 
Alternative models introducing the role of individual and social norms also 
introduced taxpayer typologies instead of a single-type of taxpayer. Cullis and Lewis 
(1997) proposed a model of tax compliance where individuals derived satisfaction 
(utility) not only from consumption but also from compliance with social norms, and 
from others’ observance of tax norms. They considered taxpayers as multifaceted 
identifying three main taxpayer types. “Compliers” pay taxes because it is required and 
fear punishment if taxes are not paid; “identifiers” pay taxes because of social norms, 
beliefs, and behaviors of those surrounding them. “Internalizers” consistently articulate 
their beliefs (including moral beliefs) with their actions regarding tax compliance. 
Another approach to how norms influence tax compliance can be found in 
Schnellenbach (2006), where tax compliance is driven by considerations of legitimacy 
and fairness. Individuals are assumed to be guided by an intrinsic motivation to fulfill 
their obligations fed by, 
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“…participation rights in collective decision making or of a fair treatment 
of taxpayers by the authorities…” (p.118) 
 
In this model, individual beliefs (normative or positive) on taxation and the 
workings of government are what drive individual tax compliance. Only individual norms 
count; individual considerations of government legitimacy (justified levels of taxes and a 
working government administration) compel individuals to comply. Not complying with 
taxes when the government is considered legitimate violates personal beliefs leading to 
psychological costs - named dissonance costs. 
In contrast with Schnellenbach, Bosco and Mittoni (1997) have used social and 
individual norms at explaining tax compliance. They tested the model experimentally 
using both types of norms plus traditional deterrence and punishment factors. In their 
experiment they found that moral (individual) constraints significantly alter compliant 
behavior whereas social constraints were not significant influences in the decision to 
comply with taxes. 
With a basic background on the role of individual and social norms on individual 
tax compliance, I now turn to introduce Tax Morale. 
 
3.2. Tax Morale 
 
Tax Morale has been defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Torgler, 
2003b, 2006). Although Tax Morale seeks to explore how individual attitudes towards 
tax compliance affect compliant behavior, it has focused so far on what affects individual 
attitudes towards compliance with taxes. 
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Tax Morale – like the models introduced in earlier sections - assigns an important 
role to norms that regulate individuals’ lives in how they shape individual compliance. 
Norms include not only individual but also institutional norms (Torgler, 2003b). Norms - 
formal and informal - are important because they act as guides for individual behavior 
reducing uncertainty in social exchanges (North, 1994). 
In another departure from the neoclassical model, Tax Morale constructs 
individuals’ rationality as limited; norms fill in the gaps (e.g. whether others pay their fair 
share of taxes) as guidance in their own tax compliance decisions (Torgler, 2003b). 
Formal norms matter to Tax Morale; for instance, a complex tax code may seek to 
improve the system’s fairness by taxing more precisely those that should be taxed. 
However, to the extent that increased code complexity may impose unfair burdens on 
individuals’ capabilities, it may affect taxpayers’ perception of the equity of the tax 
system, and lower their willingness to comply (Torgler, 2003b). 
Individuals may be affected differently by different types of norms. Some may be 
affected by what others around them think (or do) about complying with taxes, whereas 
others may be impervious to what happens around them. Based on norm sensitivity, four 








Table 3.1. Taxpayer and Collective Action Typologies 
Taxpayer Type Attributes “Collective action” equivalent type 
Social Taxpayer Influenced by social norms 
Sensitive to others’ beliefs and 
actions (especially those close to 
them) 
“Comply if others comply” 
Conditional Cooperators 
(cooperate if others do 
their part) 
Intrinsic Taxpayer Sense of Duty/obligation towards tax 
compliance 
Sensitive to the ways government 
treats individuals 
“Comply if authorities treat them 
fairly” 
Conditional Cooperators 
(if authorities do not 
enforce rules, they may 
withdraw cooperation) 
Honest Taxpayer Insensitive to norms 
“always comply” 
Altruistic 
Tax Evader Cost-benefit calculators of risks v. 
benefits of tax evasion 





Tax Morale provides a broader conception of individual behavior than the 
neoclassical model. Tax Evaders match the model of behavior in the neoclassical model; 
their compliance attitude is shaped by a benefit-cost calculation and they are unconcerned 
about the social environment. In addition to tax evaders, three additional types are 
proposed. So-called Social Taxpayers are influenced in their attitudes towards taxes on 
what others do regarding their own taxes. Unlike the previous group, Intrinsic Taxpayers 
attitudes towards tax compliance are affected by the way authorities treat them. Finally, 
Altruistic Taxpayers’ compliance attitudes are that of “always comply” regardless of 
social or individual attitudes. 
The most interesting aspect of the taxpayer typologies is how they parallel similar 
developments in the social sciences, notably those in the literature on collective action. 
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Ostrom (2000a) developed a typology regarding individual attitudes towards cooperation, 
which it is included in the last column of Table 3.1 to illustrate how both overlap. 
Conditional cooperators overlaps both the social and intrinsic taxpayers, whereas 
“altruists” mirrors the “honest taxpayers” and “rational egoists” corresponds squarely 
with the “tax evader” both mirroring the model of behavior of the economics of crime 
approach. The importance of those parallels is that they may offer new insights in what 
shapes individual behavior. 
Parallelisms between collective action and Tax Morale extend to the role of norms 
in shaping individual behavior. Collective action posits that individuals know that they 
would be better off by cooperating, but if many others withhold their cooperation then the 
best strategy would be not to cooperate. For instance, taxpayers may understand the long-
run consequences of tax evasion (lower provision of public goods and services and lower 
social well-being) but short-term considerations (e.g. perceived tax evasion on others, or 
mistreatment at the hands of government officials) may push them into non-compliance. 
“Fixing” the incentives structure (raising audit rates and/or penalties) would not solve the 
problem because of the reasons argued in chapter 2 – crowding out voluntary tax 
compliance. 
Tax Morale –like some of the models reviewed earlier - shifted the theoretical 
emphasis from predicting non-compliant behavior (the neoclassical model of tax evasion) 
to predicting what may affect individual attitudes towards tax compliance as represented 





The chart seeks to illustrate the differences of focus between the neoclassical 
model which attempts to predict tax evasion behavior (placed close to the origin in the 
chart) in an individual (no other factors matter) and continuous basis (adjusting 
compliance/evasion at the margin). By contrast, Tax Morale –although it seeks to explain 
individual tax compliance from individual attitudes- has yet to provide a more thorough 
path from attitudes to behavior. Because such work is not complete (Halla, 2010) Tax 
Morale is placed farther away from the origin (to the left and up) Because individual 
compliance is shaped by their observance of norms, taxpayer behavior no longer follows 
Figure 3.1. Tax Compliance and Tax Morale 
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a strict cost-benefit calculation but is embedded within a social context that shapes it, 
represented by its position to the left along the social-individual dimension. The move 
represents the results from tax compliance experiments where subjects were exposed to 
different types of communication among them (indirect communication “signals”, direct 
communication “face-to-face”) and how they affected tax compliance (Alm, McClelland, 
and Schulze, 1992, 1999).  
Likewise, Tax Morale is placed high along the vertical axis to represent that the 
factors that were posited to affect tax compliance under the neoclassical model have been 
found not to affect individual attitudes towards tax compliance (Torgler, 2003a); instead, 
other factors affect individual willingness to comply with taxes, such as trust in 
government (Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009, Torgler, 2003a, b, Cummings et al., 
2004), pride in one’s nationality (Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009), and religious 
beliefs (Torgler, 2005b, 2006). 
 
3.2.1. Tax Morale Limitations 
 
Like any hypothesis, Tax Morale is a representation of reality and as such is not 
free of shortcomings or limitations. Posner (2000) made a more extreme case arguing that 
the disparate compliance rates among different taxes suggest that Tax Morale may not 
exist. That would be a possibility if there were just one type of individual; however, there 
are diverse types of taxpayers, and each in turn may form specific evaluations about 
specific taxes in the same way that norms affect their behavior differently. Hammar, 
Jagers and Nordblom (2009) studied taxpayer perceptions of tax evasion for specific 
taxes in Sweden and found large variations in perceptions of tax evasion across different 
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taxes; taxes perceived as more evaded would be evaded the most to avoid being labeled a 
“sucker”. That interpretation is supported by the fact that trust in their fellow citizens 
doing their part regarding taxes was a main factor explaining those differences in 
perceptions of tax evasion. 
Perceptions of government legitimacy may also affect compliance with taxes. If 
the government collecting taxes is perceived as illegitimate (e.g. usurped access to power 
or treats individuals despotically), individuals have the right to resist it and withholding 
resources –  not paying taxes - is one way to do it (Torgler, 2002)..Therefore, Tax Morale 
may exist independently of divergent rates of compliance across taxes, or even in the 
presence of substantial evasion. 
Halla (2010) concerned with the scarce evidence linking Tax Morale with tax 
compliant behavior provided different suggestions for testing the relationship between 
Tax Morale and taxpayer behavior including, 
1. Linking randomized in-depth audits and panel survey data 
2. Using laboratory experiments augmented with surveys 
Regarding the first suggestion, getting data not only on compliant behavior but 
also on individual attitudes may be as difficult as getting data on tax evasion alone. 
Regardless of data limitations, some empirical work has been done and its findings 
support a relationship between Tax Morale and tax compliance. For instance, Murphy 
(2004) used data from a survey conducted among taxpayers already accused of tax 
evasion in Australia reporting that their trust in tax authorities was much lower than 
among the general population. She also found that their resistance to tax authorities could 
be predicted by their level of trust in authorities. One obvious limitation of the data is that 
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surveyed taxpayers were already accused of tax evasion so we do not know whether their 
lower confidence in authorities stemmed from a perception that the accusation was unfair 
or it was always low to the extent of engaging in questionable tax behavior. Wenzel 
(2005) used data from another survey and reported evidence of a complex web of 
relationships between tax ethics (Tax Morale) and tax compliance, between perceived 
social norms and individual tax ethics, and perception of social norms and tax 
compliance. Although his results also provided support for an ex-post rationalization of 
tax evasion - consistent with the neoclassical model of tax evasion –his findings are also 
consistent with the existence of different types of taxpayers driven by different norms and 
motives (not only self-interest). 
Because data issues may slow developments in connecting individual attitudes to 
individual behavior regarding taxes, experimental methods may offer the best 
compromise to test how individual attitudes influence individual behavior. In particular, 
inter-disciplinary collaboration adding to behavioral economics the most recent advances 
from neuroscience using brain imaging techniques and checking brain chemistry may 
reveal what goes on in individuals’ minds when deciding on paying their taxes. For 
instance, recent research has revealed that there are unique differences in brain activity of 
experimental subjects when engaged in a cooperation task versus pursuing one’s own 
self-interest and defect (Sanfrey, 2007). Further, experiments have revealed that 
individuals’ brains automatically offloads information that gets subconsciously processed 
via intuition and pattern recognition that in turn influences individual decision making 
(Camerer, 2007); that may explain the role of norms in tax compliance – a mechanism to 
simplify decision-making reducing cognitive demands. 
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To summarize, Tax Morale is defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. 
Norms shape individual behavior because they are used by bounded-rational individuals 
as aids on what to do regarding compliance with taxes. Because taxpayers respond 
differently to different types of norms, different types of taxpayers may be identified 
based on their relative sensitivity to norms. Finally, government norms may affect Tax 
Morale according to the fairness of tax norms and procedures, and how they treat 
individuals. The role of norms in shaping individual attitudes mirrors developments in 
other social sciences, more notably in the literature of collective action thus opening the 
possibility of using its theoretical and empirical insights in the field of tax compliance. 
Tax Morale’s main limitation comes from the still under-developed relationship between 
individual attitudes and individual behavior; despite of data limitation problems, some 
empirical work has been done showing results consistent with the proposition that 
individual attitudes towards tax compliance affect individual behavior. 
The next section introduces the review of the literature regarding the factors affect 
individual Tax Morale. 
 
3.3. Trust in Government and Tax Morale 
 
Starting with a revision of the most recent literature, Torgler (2003a) studied 
individual Tax Morale among individuals from European democracies and reported that 
individuals having a higher degree of confidence in the Legal System have higher Tax 
Morale. Trusting the legal system may lead to accepting government’s decisions and 
provide an incentive to obey its rules; trusting government officials also affected Tax 
Morale (Torgler 2003a, 137). 
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Similarly, Torgler’s (2003b) study of Tax Morale in Switzerland found that 
individuals trusting the government and the legal system also had higher levels of Tax 
Morale. Moreover, the more extensive the forms of direct democracy participation 
available the higher the individual’s motivation towards complying with his/her taxes, 
which may be interpreted as it is fair for governments to let individuals decide directly 
what they want the government to do. On the other hand, if a government is perceived as 
corrupt, taxpayers will not trust it become more inclined towards evading their taxes 
(Cummings et al., 2004). Using survey data from the U.S., Botswana, and South Africa, 
the authors found that individuals trusting the legal system, the government, and national 
officers were more likely to have higher Tax Morale. The dependent variable -Tax 
Morale- was constructed using a question from the Afrobarometer that asked individuals 
whether they had engaged in not paying income taxes (an approach followed in virtually 
all the studies considered). 
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2005, 2009) studied the evolution of Tax Morale 
in Spain in the period 1975-2000; in this case, the study covered the period from the end 
of Franco’s dictatorship to the consolidation of democracy. They found that Tax Morale 
increased in Spain over time. In addition, individuals who trust the Parliament also had 
higher Tax Morale, and those who had a high sense of pride in their nationality were also 
found to be more likely to have higher Tax Morale, 
“…if the Parliament is seen to be acting in a trustworthy way, taxpayers’ 
trust in the state increases and so would their willingness to comply with 
their tax obligations…” (p. 16) 
 
Torgler (2005) analyzed Tax Morale in developing countries of Latin America 
using survey data from two different sources (Latinobarometro, and World Values 
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Survey) and reported that individuals that trusted government (trust in the president in 
one dataset, and satisfaction with national officers in the other) were most likely to report 
Tax Morale. 
Alm and Torgler (2006) compared Tax Morale between the U.S. and several 
European countries using WVS data. In particular, they tested for differences in Tax 
Morale between Spain and the U.S. and found out that trust in government has a positive 
impact on Tax Morale, 
“…focusing on how the relationship between the state and its citizens is 
established; they also allow us to analyze trust more closely at the current 
politico-economic level…” (p. 236). 
 
Again, trust in Parliament and the Legal system affect Tax Morale among those 
that trust those organizations, 
”…if the state acts in a trustworthy way, then taxpayers might be more 
willing to comply with the taxes…treatment seen by individuals as unfair 
may lead to resentment…” (p. 236) 
 
Torgler and Schneider (2007) discussed factors shaping Tax Morale in multi-
cultural European countries -Belgium, Spain and Switzerland- using WVS data. They 
reported that -those who trust government were more likely to report higher Tax Morale; 
With those results showing a consistent relationship between trust in government 
and Tax Morale, let us turn to examine in more detail the rationale offered for the 





The results in the previous section clearly indicate that trusting government is 
associated with higher Tax Morale. However, it is not clear what governments do to elicit 
individual trust in them. Two possible explanations on how governments may affect 
individual tax moral can be cited. On the one hand, it has been suggested that 
governments that act trustworthily or are perceived as being fair may elicit individual 
trust. On the other hand, perhaps reflecting economists’ focus on individual choices, it 
has been theorized that governments may elicit trust when deliver what individuals 
demand; widespread support for the programs provided by government legitimates 
government actions and imposes a social norm towards paying taxes (Alm and Martinez-
Vazquez, 2007), 
“…survey evidence suggests that some people will not pay their taxes if 
they dislike the way their taxes are spent, if they feel they have no say in 
the decision process, if they feel that government is unresponsive to their 
wishes, or if they feel they are treated unfairly by government…” (p. 49). 
 
The two broad explanations offered to explain how governments affect individual 
Tax Morale cited in the quote may be summarized as follows 
1. Individuals will not pay unless government spends their taxes in ways they 
favor 
2. Individuals have a say on how government spends taxpayers’ (that is, voters’ 
money) or the government treats them fairly 
With regards to the first point, it seems questionable that tax compliance decisions 
are driven primarily by the results in the ballot box, or by what the political institutions 
decide. In advanced democracies a sizable part of the population chooses not to vote in 
general elections, thus questioning the basic insight that governments elicit compliance 
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by spending consistent with voters’ preferences. If individuals do not bother with 
expressing their policy preferences via voting, how would governments know what they 
want?  
There is another problem with this argument; it falls short in explaining why those 
whose preferences were not selected – either their preferred candidate or preferred policy 
alternative did not get selected - would still be willing to comply with their taxes. If 
taxpayers were to comply with their taxes according to the match of government actions 
with their preferences, given that a sizable proportion either does not vote or selects the 
losing alternatives, we should expect widespread tax noncompliance. Hetherington 
(2004) pointedly observed that trust in government is necessary only when individuals 
pay the cost of policies and do not receive the benefits. Why should those whose 
preferences have not been favored by government pay taxes? 
With regards to the second argument provides a comprehensive explanation. 
Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are more compliant when they have a 
voice on how their taxes are spent (Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1993) and when they can 
vote on how tax enforcement should be done (Alm McClelland and Schulze, 1999). 
Those findings suggest when individuals are given an outlet to express their opinion 
about what policies should be adopted that positively affects tax compliance and that is 
regardless of the policy actually selected. That may be so because individuals may value 
the way that governments give them the same way they may value a certain policy 
outcome; if individuals interpret being asked about their preferences as a signal that 
government considers them as mature and responsible partners in governance, individuals 
would in turn reciprocate that treatment and comply voluntarily with their tax obligations 
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without further coercion. Survey evidence from Switzerland confirms that individuals 
actually derive satisfaction being allowed to decide on policy matters directly – direct 
democracy (Frey and Stutzer, 2005). 
With the insight that taxpayers value being given a voice on government decisions 
that affect their well-being, the question is whether sporadic incursions to the ballot box 
is the only mechanism to elicit and keep Tax Morale high enough and for and long 
enough to induce individuals to voluntarily comply with their taxes. Based on insights 
from recent findings in the literature on institutional trust and other sources, I will 
hypothesize that governments interact with taxpayers in several ways and that those 
interactions have an even more pronounced impact on individual Tax Morale. Two 
questions would help in unveiling the mechanism linking government actions with Tax 
Morale, 
1. What actions do government institutions undertake that may be conductive to 
create, improve, or undermine citizens’ trust in government? 
2. What government institutions are the most likely to produce actions affecting 
citizens’ trust? 
To summarize, the empirical literature has found a consistent relationship 
between individual trust in government and Tax Morale. Higher willingness to comply is 
associated with higher trust in government. The proposed mechanisms leave some 
unanswered questions and therefore a more comprehensive mechanism on how 
governments affect individual trust - which in turn would affect Tax Morale – should be 
developed incorporating the more recent insights from the literature on political trust 
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because that literature has dealt itself with how political institutions affect individual trust 
(Levi and Stoker, 2000). 
 
3.4. Religious Beliefs and Tax Morale 
 
Another factor influencing individual Tax Morale is religious beliefs. Religion is 
a system of beliefs that limit individual discretion away from acts that may be seen as 
morally unacceptable; it operates as a heuristic to reduce uncertainty by way of providing 
rules of behavior, or as a device to reduce “transaction costs”. Religion may be seen as a 
moral force that motivates individuals to act in determinate ways in the same way that 
religious organizations may provide a society’ moral constitution (Torgler, 2006) 
Interestingly, he briefly introduced ideology when borrowing from Douglass North’s 
definition of ideology as a system of constraints on individual behavior. Two 
implications are that ideology and religion may be seen as playing a similar role of 
constraining and guiding individual behavior, and that both ideology and religion can be 
considered as individual beliefs, a point that would be explored when elaborating a 
hypothesis about individual beliefs and Tax Morale. 
The impact of religious beliefs on individual Tax Morale was evaluated in detail 
in Torgler (2006). Using World Values Survey (WVS) data from several countries, the 
influence of religiosity on Tax Morale was gauged in different ways. For instance, active 
involvement with religious organizations appeared correlated with individual Tax 
Morale. Other measures of individual involvement with religion - attending services and 
belonging actively to a religious group - raises the Tax Morale for individuals engaging 
in those activities when they belonging to certain religions -Catholic, Protestant, 
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Orthodox. Those results provide support for the assertion that religion provides some 
behavioral standards that motivate individuals not to break norms (and among those that 
of paying their taxes). Interestingly, the study offered a counter-check of religion’s 
influence on Tax Morale by analyzing whether individuals engage in certain rule-
breaking behaviors such as claiming government benefits to which they were not entitled 
or knowingly buying stolen goods (Torgler identified it as trustworthiness). Higher 
trustworthiness was found to be positively related with one’s Tax Morale both on its own 
right and with regards to religion. 
In a different study, Torgler (2003a) studied Tax Morale determinants in 
Switzerland and reported that religiosity -measured as church attendance- had a positive 
influence on an individual’s Tax Morale. Similar findings were reported by Alm and 
Torgler (2006) that compared Tax Morale between European countries and the U.S., and 
that reported that church attendance as a measure of an individual’s religious beliefs was 
positively correlated with one’s Tax Morale. Torgler and Schneider (2007) made a 
similar case in the comparison between three European countries -Spain, Belgium, and 
Switzerland- and found out that church attendance was positively correlated with 
individual Tax Morale. 
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2005, 2009) reported in their study of the 
evolution of Tax Morale in Spain since the democratic restoration that religiosity -
measured as a self-assessment of a person being religious or not- also affects Tax Morale; 
it is hypothesized that religiosity and churches may induce individuals to restrain 
themselves from engaging in unethical behavior (such as cheating on taxes). 
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Overall, the empirical evidence provides support for religious beliefs playing a 
role in shaping individual Tax Morale; individuals’ religious beliefs have been measured 
in different ways but the results have been similar, namely the higher the level of 





The evidence for the influence of religious beliefs on Tax Morale does not 
prevent from making some observations regarding the policy implications of those 
findings. First, religiosity may operate as a parameter for tax policy instead of a variable 
to be controlled or manipulated. It seems difficult (if not impossible) for governments to 
manipulate individuals’ religiosity to increase their willingness to comply with their 
taxes. Even if religious beliefs run high among the population, attempts at manipulating 
the religious element to increase individual Tax Morale may risk a backlash as such 
moves may be resented and bring a decrease in Tax Morale. 
A second aspect that seems to limit the importance of religious beliefs in shaping 
Tax Morale deals with the increasing secularization of modern societies. Dalton (1996) 
observed that religion has been losing its importance as a provider of guidance for voting 
behavior in modern industrial democracies. It is not difficult to see that there are less and 
less citizens for which religion plays a role in guiding their lives. Consequently, 
secularization has increased the number of nonreligious citizens for which religious 
norms of behavior – or the constraints against engaging in certain kinds of behavior – 
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may not apply. In other words, the importance of religiosity in shaping Tax Morale may 
be so for a decreasing portion of the citizenry. 
Another issue concerns not the relevance of religious beliefs by themselves but 
instead that other individual beliefs have not been considered. Ideology is a clear 
candidate to be tested as to whether it affects individual Tax Morale. Because ideology – 
as well as religious beliefs – constraints individual behavior, it is somewhat surprising 
that the potential impact of the former has not been considered or tested. 
Denzau and North (1994) discussed in more detail how ideology shapes human 
action through its positive and normative implications. Ideology fills the knowledge gaps 
individuals have about the environment by providing a representation of what the world 
is about and how it should look like. In other words, ideologies offer a “guide” on what to 
expect from the environment and how to interact with it, 
“…ideologies are the shared frameworks of mental models that groups of 
individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment 
and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured…” 
(Denzau and North 1994, p. 3) 
 
By providing a normative prescription on how to structure the environment, 
ideology provides a critical component in the creation and crafting of the tools – 
institutions - that individuals use to transform the environment, 
 “…the mental models that the mind creates and the institutions that 
individuals create are both essential to the way human beings structure 
their environment in their interactions with it…” (Denzau and North 
1994, 4) 
 
Therefore, ideology provides a blueprint of the environment and a normative 
prescription on how it should look like, and institutions are shaped by those ideological 
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beliefs to operate on the environment to conform it to the normative prescriptions of 
ideology. 
Our particular interest rests on how ideological beliefs may shape individuals’ 
understanding of society and the state, and how those representations may translate into 
attitudes towards tax compliance – Tax Morale; that would be further developed in the 
next chapter. 
 
3.5. Support for Democracy and Tax Morale 
 
In comparison with the previous factors, the influence of individual support for 
democracy in Tax Morale has received somewhat less attention. The main finding is that 
individuals who supported democracy as form of government were more likely to exhibit 
Tax Morale than those who did not (e.g. Torgler 2005b, Torgler and Schneider, 2007). In 
addition, certain democratic practices –direct democracy- affect Tax Morale. Torgler 
(2003a) studied Swiss cantons and reported that direct democracy institutions (referenda) 
have a positive impact on Tax Morale; the higher the degree of citizens’ direct 
participation in government decision-making the higher the Tax Morale. Those findings 
mirror those from Feld and Frey (2002a) that reported higher Tax Morale in those Swiss 
cantons were participation rights were more extended. 
In another study, Torgler and Schneider (2007) study of Tax Morale in three 
multi-cultural European countries – Switzerland, Spain, and Belgium - found that support 
for democracy -measured as the extent to which individuals evaluated democracy as a 
good system to govern one’s country- affected individual Tax Morale, higher levels of 
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support for democracy were associated with higher Tax Morale for the two countries in 
which it was measured -Belgium and Spain. 
What those findings suggest is that individual support for democracy drives Tax 
Morale up. Similarly, support for institutions that grant individuals more participation in 
policymaking - like referenda - also increase individual willingness to comply with taxes 
and lower tax evasion (Feld and Frey, 2002b). Two broad issues - how to measure 
individual support for democracy, and whether other types of political regimes may also 




The findings in the empirical literature suggest a link between individual support 
for democracy and individual willingness to comply with taxes. It is a plausible result; if 
they live under a democratic regime, those who favor democracy are more likely to be 
willing to contribute to sustain the political regime they prefer. Two issues deserve 
further attention. The first one concerns with how to measure individual support for 
democracy. The second issue is whether individual preferences for other types of political 
regimes may also affect Tax Morale. 
With regards to the first issue, Inglehart (2003) has questioned the extent to which 
measures of overt support for democracy really measures individual commitment with 
democratic values and democracy as a desired system of government (those have been 
the measures used in the reviewed studies on Tax Morale). To illustrate his claim, he 
tabulated the World Values Survey’s response to the questions used to gauge individual 
support for different political regimes. Support for democracy seems virtually universal 
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even where their political systems are clearly away from democracy (as understood in the 
Western World), such as China. However, individual support for other types of regimes 
(military rule, or ruled by leaders not hindered by elections or parliaments) show a 
pattern that betrays measures of overt support for democracy. Individual support for 
democracy is very high among individuals from advanced democracies; support for non-
democratic government types is quite low. The further away the move from those 
democracies, the higher the support for non-democratic forms of government. Therefore, 
assessment of whether individual support for democracy affects Tax Morale should take 
into account issues of how to better measure that support. 
The second issue is a generalization of the finding that support for democracy 
increases Tax Morale. The specific question to elucidate concerns whether individuals are 
more willing to comply with their taxes when those resources support a political system 
that they prefer - regardless of it being a democracy or not. 
 
3.6. Demographics and Tax Morale 
 
Analysis of socio-demographic factors and their impact on Tax Morale has been 
subordinate to establishing the primary importance of other factors, e.g. trust in 
government, religiosity, or support for democracy. In particular, I would like to pay some 
attention to the circumstance that older individuals have been found to exhibit higher Tax 
Morale than younger ones. A brief review of the literature on political trust shows a 
potentially interesting pattern; younger individuals are consistently less trusting of 
government and political institutions than their elder peers. Because younger individuals 
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share both lower Tax Morale and lower trust in political institutions it may be of interest 
to explore whether there is some common factor that may explain both findings. 
Torgler (2003a) use data from Switzerland and reported that individual’s age was 
related with Tax Morale; individuals fifty to sixty-four years old had higher Tax Morale 
than those who were below fifty years old. Torgler (2003b) used survey data from Europe 
and the U.S. finding that age increases individual Tax Morale in both cases (EU and 
U.S.). Cummings et al (2004) reported similar findings in their comparison of Tax 
Morale between South Africa and the U.S. Older individuals again are more likely to 
have higher Tax Morale than younger ones; with women and married individuals having 
higher Tax Morale than men and singles respectively. 
Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2005, 2009) studied the evolution of Tax Morale 
in Spain since democratic restoration and reported that the older the individual the higher 
his Tax Morale was although the marginal effects were small. Unlike other studies, this 
one used data from the first four the World Values Survey thus providing a view of 
evolution of Tax Morale over time. Torgler (2005) in his study on Latin American 
countries reported that older individuals tend to have higher Tax Morale than younger 
ones; other socio-demographic variables showing varied results. In his study of religiosity 
and Tax Morale, Torgler (2006) reported that age being positively related with Tax 
Morale –the older the individual the higher the Tax Morale, women having higher Tax 
Morale than men. Alm and Torgler (2006) studied Tax Morale in the U.S. and Western 
Europe and reported age being positively related to Tax Morale – older individuals 
showing higher Tax Morale than younger ones. In addition, females showed higher Tax 
Morale than men. The same result – higher Tax Morale among older individuals and 
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women – was reported by Frey and Torgler (2006) in an empirical study of thirty 
European countries (western and post-communist countries). Torgler and Schneider 
(2007) studied three multi-cultural European countries (Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland) 
and found –again- that older individuals (50-64 year olds) have higher Tax Morale than 
those 30 and younger (baseline group). Finally, Feld and Torgler (2007) studied Tax 
Morale in Germany after reunification and the results regarding individuals’ age and Tax 
Morale have been in line with those already reported, that is younger individuals showing 
consistently lower Tax Morale than older ones. 
Overall, the finding that older individuals have a higher willingness to comply 
with taxes has been consistently reported in the reviewed articles. In turn, those results 
have been explained as result of older individuals being more deeply “invested” on 
societal expectations thus increasing the cost for those so invested of behaving 
dishonestly (Torgler, 2003b). Although a plausible explanation, there may be alternative 
ways to interpret them; in particular, similar patterns have been observed regarding trust 




Dalton (2005) used U.S. data to test changes over time in patterns of trust in 
political institutions. Interestingly, patterns of political trust are quite similar with those 
observed in empirical studies of Tax Morale; younger individuals show less trust in 
political institutions and –as we have seen- have lower Tax Morale. Dalton’s findings 
have been replicated virtually all advanced democracies of North America, Western 
Europe, and Japan (Norris 1999, Dalton 1999, Pharr, Putnam and Dalton, 2000); because 
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Tax Morale studies have covered those regions as well makes the possibility of a 
common explanation to those patterns. 
The post-materialist value change hypothesis (Inglehart, 1971, Inglehart and 
Flanagan, 1987) has been offered to explain changes in trust in political institutions, and 
it may be suitable to explain individual Tax Morale of young v. old individuals as well. 
He contended that individuals’ values are acquired until early adulthood and then remain 
constant for the rest of their lives, and that those values were influenced by the social and 
economic environment during the value-formation phase. Therefore, to the extent that 
different cohorts face different socioeconomic conditions their values would diverge. If 
that is the case, it may be that differences in Tax Morale among young and older 
individuals would not be the result of age but instead the consequence of upholding 
different values. The coming chapters will elaborate with more detail what those post-




Alternative models of tax compliance and Tax Morale share some similarities. 
They all share a common interest for understanding the role of individual norms, social 
norms, and institutions, in explaining tax compliance. That separates them from the 
neoclassical model of tax evasion which, in its basic form assumes that control and 
punishment drives tax compliant behavior. 
Tax Morale is the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. That willingness to comply 
with taxes is influenced by moral norms, social norms, and institutional arrangements. 
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Tax Morale acknowledges that individuals differ in their sensitivity to different types of 
norms which allows identifying broad typologies of taxpayers – instead of the single 
typology assumed in the neoclassical model. Interestingly, those taxpayer typologies may 
be readily comparable with similar typologies of individual behavior regarding individual 
attitudes towards cooperation. 
Because Tax Morale focuses on what drives individual attitudes towards tax 
compliance, it may require additional work to develop how tax compliance attitudes 
translate into tax compliance behavior. Data availability may be a problem as the 
amounts of information (and its feasibility) are more demanding than with the traditional 
model; despite of this, some experimental work done in other social and natural sciences 
suggest that there is a line connecting individual attitudes with behavior. 
The table below summarizes the empirical findings in the Tax Morale literature 
and presents the issues that will allow development of the hypotheses to be proposed in 











Table 3.2. Tax Morale. Summary of Findings and Issues 
 Findings Issues 
Trust in 
Government 
Individuals who trust government 
=> higher Tax Morale 
• Govt. address individual 
preferences about 
spending 
• giving voice to individuals 
• treating individuals fairly 
• What do governments do 
to elicit/undermine 
individual trust? 
• What government 
organizations are more 




Individuals who uphold religious 
beliefs => higher Tax Morale 
• religious norms limit 
individual discretion 
• reduce uncertainty on 
what to do 
• provide social “morals” or 
“perennial police” 
Ideology guides behavior  
• How the world works + 
how it should be 
organized 





Support for democratic system 
raises Tax Morale 
• Individuals would support 
a system they favor/ resist 
a system they dislike 
How do we measure “support for 
democracy”? 
• Some measures contradict 
with others gauging 
support for alternative  
other political systems 




Older individuals have higher Tax 
Morale than younger ones 
• Older individuals are more 
“invested” in society; 
more “costly” to evade 
taxes and get caught 
Post-materialist value change 
hypothesis: why individual values 
change over time 
• Younger individuals less 
trustful of political 
institutions 
• Younger more rebellious 
against authority 
• Value change process 









4.1. Trust in Government and Tax Morale 
 
A consistent finding in the literature is how trust in government positively 
influences individual Tax Morale. Although the results are reasonable it is unclear what 
governments do to elicit individual trust. We are doubtful about the assertion that 
individuals trust government when it spends taxes according to individuals’ preferences, 
or whether governments elicit individual trust when they treat individuals with fairness. 
Therefore, in order to determine how individual trust in government happens, we need to 
address two issues, 
1. What actions do governments take that may affect individual trust? 
2. What are the government organizations most likely to produce those actions? 
In order to answer those questions we introduce a distinction among government 
organizations that has been borrowed from Rothstein (2005). The Input side of 
government converts individual preferences into policies that will produce the goods and 
services that individuals want government to provide. The Output side of government, 
by contrast, actually delivers those goods and services to individuals. The proposed 
hypothesis rests on the fact individuals’ interactions with the output side of government 
affect their well-being immediately. Therefore, what happens at the point of public good 
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delivery is what makes taxpayers to trust or distrust government and therefore affect their 
Tax Morale. 
 
4.1.1. Input Side, Trust, and Tax Morale 
 
The modern state is not organized as a monolithic structure. Instead, government 
is a conglomerate of specific organizations that fulfill specific roles and responsibilities. 
Modern democracies use a well-known structure of three branches of government –
executive, legislative, judiciary. The input side is constituted – among democratic 
regimes – by Parliaments (the legislative branch) and the Executive branch (e.g. Prime 
Minister, President) because they introduce taxpayers’ preferences for public goods and 
services into government. Representative democracy does that through elections that send 
elected members to populate those organizations to advance the policies favored by a 
plurality of the electorate. Because those members represent the part of the electorate that 
supported them, both the Executive and the Legislative branch of government are 
partisan. They are controlled by the political fraction or fractions that gathered the 
broadest support among voters. By extension, the actions that those organizations take – 
the policies they advance - are also partisan, 
“…the main idea of the representative aspect of democracy is 
partisanship…to ensure the implementation of the political majority’s 
programs…there is nothing to stop the political majority from choosing to 
favor certain groups…” (Rothstein 2005, p. 109) 
 
Although it may be counter-argued that those bodies’ actions aim to serve the 
“common good”, such assertions miss the point; what in fact is being served is the 
version of common good that has been favored in the last election. Consequently, the 
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actions taken by those branches of government are unlikely to elicit trust in government 
and affect Tax Morale for all taxpayers. To be sure, those who support those actions may 
trust government but it does not explain why those others whose preferences would be 
favored would be willing to comply with their taxes3. Hetherington (2004) pointedly 
commented that people need to trust government when they pay its costs but they do not 
receive benefits. 
An alternative view of the problem using different conceptions of justice yields a 
similar result, namely that the input side may not affect individual trust and Tax Morale. 
Wenzel (2003) introduced a discussion about the three different types of justice that 
government seeks to address – distributive, retributive, and procedural, justice. Issues of 
distributive justice - who is best entitled to receive a resource allocation, or bear a cost – 
are decided by input government organizations. Issues of retributive justice– what 
sanctions are fair for norm violations – are also decided on the input side of government. 
Because there are different conceptions of both distributive and retributive justice those 
issues are decided in the input side of government. For instance, whether unemployed 
people deserve receiving help in their predicament versus giving money to business as 
tax cuts to reduce unemployment, or whether capital punishment is the appropriate 
penalty for certain offenses are decided by the legislative with the executive making its 
contribution to the issue .Decisions in the input side organizations are made via vote –the 
alternative with the largest support is enacted. Consequently, not everybody will be 
                                                 
 
 
3 If that were indeed the case, then we are back to the neoclassical model of tax evasion; individuals receive 
what they prefer from government and therefore have no incentive to cheat whereas they would cheat when 
they do not receive what they want. 
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satisfied with the allocations made by, say parliaments; we got partisanship again but 
without naming it. I will introduce procedural justice in the next point, but suffice for 
now to say that it helps bridging conflicting views regarding distributive and retributive 
justice ensuring that like individuals receive like treatment from authorities. 
The problem with the assertion that input institutions drive trust in government 
and Tax Morale is focused squarely on the most visible element of democracy – voting - 
but voting may be problematic. Concerns about the potential dangers of voting may be 
traced back to the U.S. revolution; Madison (1788) observed that individual freedoms are 
threatened not only by government actions but also by majorities’ decisions threatening 
the freedoms of minorities. Levi (1998) made a case similar to that of Madison but went 
further contending that the introduction of safeguards to provide special protections for 
minorities may reduce the danger of a “dictatorship of the majority” at the expense of 
creating a new problem, namely majorities’ resentment towards minorities because of the 
latter’s obstruction of the will of the former. She illustrated the point with French 
Speakers in Canada that fear being swamped by English-speakers that are the majority of 
the population in issues running along the language divide line. 
To conclude, government organizations in the input side may not seem likely to 
elicit individual trust because their actions are partisan therefore favoring certain groups 
of individuals over others. Because of this characteristic, it is unlikely that actions 
undertaken by the political organizations of government would make taxpayers that do 
not like those decisions to be willing to comply with taxes - except for a return to the 
neoclassical model of tax compliance. The problem rests with voting mechanisms that – 
if left unrestricted - may allow majorities to undermine the rights of minorities, or impose 
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undue burdens on them. Thus, with political organizations of government in question as 
drivers of individual Tax Morale, the focus in the next section is with the side of 
government that delivers policy to citizens – the output side - to evaluate whether their 
actions may affect Tax Morale. 
 
4.1.2. Output Side, Trust, and Tax Morale 
 
The previous section has shown that trust in government organizations in the 
input side may fall short of explaining why individuals trust government and exhibit Tax 
Morale -the decisions they take will leave some citizens dissatisfied – and thus unable to 
explain why those whose preferences have not being met are not more likely to cheat on 
their taxes. Lower voter turnout also conspires against that explanation because many 
taxpayers do not even bother with voicing their policy preferences – they do not vote. 
Therefore, I will turn to analyze what happens in the output side of government and 
whether its actions may affect Tax Morale. 
Procedural Justice (or procedural fairness as it is also called) is an important 
component of government actions in the output side. In his study of justice types, Wenzel 
(2003) contended that this aspect of justice has to do with the fairness of procedures used 
to reach a decision. Tyler’s (1988) empirical research made a critical connection showing 
how procedural justice explains why individuals submit to decisions made by authorities 
even when those decisions impose costs upon them. The basic insight from Tyler’s work 
is that individuals are interested not only on what they get from authorities – the realm of 
Distributive and Retributive Justice – but also on how they get it – Procedural Justice. In 
many instances, the complexity of the issues affecting individuals may exceed their 
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ability to understand them (Tyler, 1988, Ayers, 1992). In those cases, instead of 
evaluating authorities’ decisions based on what they get (or are asked to contribute) 
individuals instead focus on how authorities have treated them during the process leading 
to the decision. When individuals feel they have been treated fairly, they are more willing 
to accept those decisions. 
An important consequence of procedural justice is that when individuals perceive 
they have been treated fairly by the government they may reciprocate in kind by 
becoming more willing to comply with government’s norms and decisions, including 
willingness to comply with their taxes. A broad and expanding consensus exists on how 
issues of fairness and legitimacy affect trust in authorities in a variety of arenas, 
impacting voluntary compliance with their norms and requests (Levi, 1998, Levi and 
Stoker, 2000, Rothstein, 2005, 2009, Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), tax compliance (Feld 
and Frey, 2002, 2007, Murphy, 2004), law enforcement (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) and 
how it may affect individuals’ cooperation with authorities (De Cremer and Tyler, 2007). 
Procedural Justice explains why individuals accept outcomes even when they are not 
favorable. Because of its concern with the fairness of procedures leading to an 
adjudication decision, procedural justice helps in arbitrating conflicts among different 
conceptions of distributive and retributive justice (Wenzel, 2003). Perhaps as important, 
Procedural Justice is not limited to the relationship between individuals and the 
government but encompasses other areas of human activity as well. For instance, 
individuals in the marketplace often care about how they are treated (Lane, 1988). 
An interesting and recent development regarding fairness concerns the finding 
that individuals actually obtain satisfaction from receiving fair treatment, in the same way 
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they get satisfaction when they get the goods and services they prefer. Economists have 
started exploring whether procedural justice is a source of satisfaction (utility) for 
individuals. Benz, Frey, and Stutzer (2002) hypothesized that individuals derive 
satisfaction (utility) not only from outcomes (consumption of goods and services) but 
also from the process leading to those outcomes calling the satisfaction derived from 
processes procedural utility. Frey and Stutzer (2005) used survey data from Swiss 
cantons to test empirically the proposition that fairness of the political process might 
influence individual well-being. Individuals in Swiss cantons with more developed direct 
democracy procedures (e.g. referenda) were more satisfied than those living in less 
politically developed cantons, independent of those rights being exercised (effectively 
voting) or not. 
The finding that individuals obtain satisfaction from the way they are treated 
gives another reason to the experimental finding that direct participation in policy 
decisions increases tax compliance and reduces tax evasion (Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 
1993, 1999, Feld and Tyran, 2002). In light of the finding that individuals value receiving 
fair treatment, what individuals most likely value regarding voting mechanisms is having 
the right to express their views regardless of the final result; they most likely know that 
their individual influence on the final outcome of the election is minuscule. Political 
participation rights, however, are just one instance of how governments may elicit 
individual trust, and the discussion is about how Procedural Justice works in the output 
side of government, and a good starting point is examining the treatment received by 
taxpayers under democracy. 
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Democracy posits that individuals are equally endowed with freedoms and rights. 
The most visible are the right of voting for candidates to public office and competing for 
it. Although they are important, there are other aspects of equality that would have an 
immediate impact on individual well-being. In addition to the already mentioned rights, 
individuals are equally entitled to receive their share of public good and services, and 
here is where procedural justice comes into play. Political organizations in the input side 
decide on what the bundle of goods and services should be, but they do not deliver it. 
Instead, government organizations in the output side do; when they deliver those public 
goods and services they should treat individuals without any reservation or restraint that 
is not in the norms regulating the provision of those goods and services; in other words, 
they should treat everyone without any preconceived ideas and biases, that is individuals 
should be treated with impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). In other words, output 
organizations are impartial when the processes and procedures used to provide (or deny) 
goods and services to individuals should be transparent, explicit, and consistently applied 
to all4. It is impartial treatment of individuals what legitimates government actions in the 
output side in the same way that fair and free elections legitimate access to the occupants 
of public office. When government treats individuals in a fair way, it becomes legitimate 
by the way it exercises its powers over the citizenry. 
The importance of fair and impartial treatment highlighted by Rothstein and 
Teorell (2008) has been recognized in the tax compliance literature as promoting 
                                                 
 
 
4 Lane (1988) highlighted an important aspect of procedural fairness when positing that procedures and 
norms that are too complex for the average individual to understand are unfair even if applied consistently 
to all individuals; he contended that it is unfair to push individuals to understand norms and procedures 
beyond the reach of their abilities. 
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voluntary tax compliance. Using clear and transparent procedures with taxpayers, 
listening to their concerns, helping them to meet their tax obligations, are all part of the 
new paradigm of tax compliance that seeks to build a relationship of trust and respect 
between taxpayers and authorities (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007, Braithwaite 
2003a) taxpayers respond to the treatment received from authorities when deciding 
whether to comply with their taxes (Feld and Frey, 2007); they are more likely to comply 
when they perceive they have been treated fairly even if compliance means accepting a 
sanction for non-compliance. Overall, fair treatment of those who deal with the output 
side of government – procedural justice - is a key element in eliciting cooperation and 
trust from individuals (De Cremer and Tyler, 2007). 
The importance of fair and impartial treatment to legitimate the exercise of 
authority in the output side becomes clear when deviations from it such as corruption are 
considered. By making access to public goods and services contingent to engaging in 
private transactions with government officials exchanging them for bribes or other favors, 
corruption effectively undermines procedural justice because public goods are only 
available those who bribe their access to them; democratic ethics being damaged in the 
process as well as individual trust (Warren, 2004). Unlike corruption in the input side of 
government, corruption in the output side has an immediate impact on individual well-
being; getting unemployment or retirement benefits, getting protection of one’s property 
and physical safety, or getting healthcare and education, are some of the circumstances 
where individual well-being is at stake and where corruption or other forms of 
discrimination breaks down the basic democratic principle of equality among individuals. 
In turn, individuals may use what they have learned about government through those 
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interactions with government officials and make inferences about the extent to which 
government as a whole represents their interests (Rohrschneider, 2005). 
Individual exposure to corruption does not only affect its immediate well-being 
but also further undermines the legitimacy of the political system and interpersonal trust. 
Seligson (2002) found that to be the case when studying corruption in Latin American 
countries. It would be very difficult for a government to claim that it treats all individuals 
equally when its citizens are victims of corruption or discrimination at the hands of street-
level bureaucrats or the police. Therefore, individual trust is elicited or undermined 
according to the way individuals are treated by the output side of government. 
Consequently, we will test the following proposition, 
Individuals that trust the output organizations of government - courts, 
government bureaucracies, or law enforcement - would be more likely to exhibit 
Tax Morale than those who do not trust them. 
The policy implications are straightforward. If the hypothesis is empirically 
supported, it would suggest that government attempts to elicit Tax Morale should start 
where government officials meet individuals face-to-face (output side) because trust in 
government is mostly built, maintained, or destroyed, there. The relevance of direct, face-
to-face interactions in building relationships of trust and cooperation between taxpayers 
and tax authorities is supported by findings that suggest direct contacts between 
individuals provide superior clues about the trustworthiness of one another (Ostrom 1998, 
2000a), which in this case would translate as taxpayers getting clues about government’s 
attitudes towards its citizens through the treatment received from its officials. 
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Second, the importance of the output side of government in building individual 
trust – a condition for increasing Tax Morale – suggests that tax administration reform is 
one part of a broader reform of public bureaucracies dealing with the public. What the tax 
compliance literature has proposed as paradigm for tax authorities to improve voluntary 
tax compliance – fostering trust between tax authorities and taxpayers by treating the 
latter with respect, apply transparent procedures to them, help out taxpayers to fulfill their 
tax duties, among others – are not different from what political scientists have been 
proposing for the output side of government if individual compliance wants to be elicited 
–treat individuals with fairness and impartiality, apply procedures individuals can 
understand, provide voice to individuals in their dealings with authorities. 
A third implication is that reforms in the organizations of the output side of 
government are necessary for democracies to consolidate as viable regimes and building 
trust among individuals. A political system’s legitimacy before its inhabitants stems not 
only from how it has accessed power but also by the ways it exercises power over its 
citizens. Legitimacy for democratic regimes require not only vertical accountability, that 
is government officials held accountable to citizens by way of free and fair elections, but 
also horizontal accountability where state institutions control one another and citizens 
may be sure that their rights and freedoms will be upheld and respected (O’Donnell, 
2004). Because exposing individuals to government corruption undermines legitimacy of 
the political system as well as interpersonal trust (Seligson, 2002), building a professional 
and impartial bureaucracy under the same mold proposed for tax administrations may be 
a good step in re-building both trust in government and in their fellow citizens (Rothstein 
2000, Rothstein and Stolle, 2002) 
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4.2 Ideology and Tax Morale 
 
Studying ideologies’ potential influence on Tax Morale is particularly interesting 
of the way ideologies shape individuals, society and its institutions. However, regardless 
of its salience and its presence on political and policy debates we are unaware whether 
ideology and its potential impact on Tax Morale have been addressed. Denzau and North 
(1994) discussed how ideologies shape economic change, asserting that dogmas, myths, 
and incomplete theories play an important role in explaining what individuals do and why 
they do it -because of its positive prescriptions on how the environment works and how it 
should be structured. 
Ideologies are necessary because of individuals’ inability to fully grasp the world 
around them and how to interact with it. Because of those limitations, individuals cannot 
form an objective model of the environment necessary to successfully operate on it. 
Ideologies play the crucial role of filling in knowledge gaps providing a representation of 
what the world is about and how it should look like; it is in this way that ideologies shape 
individual behavior. When studying the influence of religious beliefs on Tax Morale 
Torgler (2006) borrowed a definition from Douglass North similar to the role of religious 
beliefs. Ideology and religion share the feature that both constrain individual behavior by 
promoting certain actions and discouraging others. 
Ideologies have a crucial influence in the creation and crafting of the tools used to 
transform the environment – institutions. Because ideology supplies the “evidence” that 
is not otherwise available (ideology’s statements do not need to be factually accurate 
because if those facts would exist then ideology would not be necessary), it  ends up 
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influencing institutional design since that design will be based both on facts (available) 
and beliefs (used in the absence of factual evidence). However, those institutions would 
most likely reflect the prevailing ideology of those with the power to devise or influence 
institutional creation or change5. Ideologies are the mental models representing the 
environment while institutions materialize those mental maps in rules and norms that 
allow individuals to operate in that environment. 
One interesting aspect of ideology is that different – and contradictory - 
ideologies may coexist. O’Donnell (1998) provides an illustration on how alternate and 
contradictory ideologies are at the foundation of democratic institutions. He contended 
that three different traditions –democracy, republicanism, and liberalism – contribute a 
fundamental pillar of modern democracy but also contradict the other two, as each have a 
different view on the role of individuals, private and public spheres, and government. The 
democratic tradition contributes the notion that individuals are equally qualified to decide 
on government matters and occupy public office; republicanism provides the idea that 
public officials are subject to the limits imposed by laws and to the purse of the public 
interest (as opposed to personal interests). Finally, the liberal tradition supplies the idea 
that there are certain individual rights that no power should violate (not even the state). 
However, each tradition (ideology) taken separately and to its extreme denies the basic 
tenets of the other two. Taken each of those ideologies alone, each denies the constitutive 
                                                 
 
 
5 An illustration with a contemporaneous issue may be done by considering the opposition of certain groups 
to same-sex marriage. Their opposition is based on the grounds that their beliefs say that marriage is meant 
to be between a m an an d a  w oman, t o which t hey add s ome ‘scientific” evide nce that it is i ndeed 
questionable. But the point to be made is  that religion plays the same role as id eology. With no ultimate 
evidence on t he m erits or de merits of sa me-sex m arriage, those groups i nstead re ly o n views that tell  
individuals what the world is about and how the institutions dealing with it should be structured. 
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“facts” of the other two. Thus, the democratic component alone leads to a dictatorship of 
majorities; no individual right – the cornerstone of liberalism – should stand in the way of 
that majority. By its part, liberalism alone ignoring democracy and republicanism 
degenerates into plutocracy; no notion of common good would be supported that may 
encroach individual rights and freedoms (e.g. property rights). Finally, prevalence of 
republicanism without democracy and liberalism degenerates into dictatorship by self-
righteous elite –only the common good matters and individual rights and majorities’ 
opinions are secondary. Emphasizing how ideologies coexist even if they contradict one 
another would be useful in the coming section when developing the argument on how 
different ideological positions regarding government policy in general and taxation in 
particular may have an impact on Tax Morale. 
To summarize, ideologies give individuals a blueprint of the environment and a 
normative prescription on how it should be manipulated. They are useful in helping 
individuals to shape their mental maps of reality and by extension they shape societal that 
operate on the environment in order to achieve the normative prescriptions of ideology. 
However, ideologies are not objective knowledge but a combination of some factual 
information with beliefs, ideas, prejudices, and half-baked theories to enable individual 
and collective action. 
With those basic insights about ideology we can now turn towards more specific 
positions regarding the state and its actions particularly regarding taxation. 
 
4.2.1. Ideology, the State, and Public Policy 
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We have seen how ideology shapes individual understanding of the environment 
and the societal institutions that direct modern societies including modern democracies. 
We have explored briefly how ideologies have shaped different aspects of modern 
democracies but we need to go further and explore how ideologies shape individual 
attitudes towards the state and especially towards tax policy because taxation is unique to 
government. 
Governments –like individuals - face uncertainties about how the environment 
works and the potential impacts of policies. The actions that governments propose to 
undertake, those that are undertaken, and those they refrain from doing are influenced – 
among other considerations - by ideology. Ideology in policy debates arise from two 
broad positions that seek to provide a “model” about the interaction between individuals, 
society, and the state. One position posits that state intervention in individual (private) 
matters is always negative; it is proposed that state interventions in society should be 
limited exclusively to protect individual freedoms and private property. With those 
“facts” settled, the normative prescription recommends that the smaller and the least 
active the State the better because state size and activity represents a real threat to 
individual freedom (Rudolph and Evans, 2005). 
The other position starts from the premise that unchecked economic inequality 
among individuals is a threat to individual freedom because extreme inequality would 
empower the most affluent individuals to rule in their favor undermining the freedoms 
and justice of all. Therefore, the normative action for the state is taking a stance and act 
reducing economic inequality among individuals. 
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A quick glance of both ideological positions reveals their gap-filling nature since 
they are more about values and beliefs than about facts. For instance, the factual claims 
made by each are unproven. It is unproven that all government intervention in society is 
negative in the same way that it is not clear that solving economic inequality should be 
only concern of the state. It may happen that differences in material means translate into 
differences in individual standing when claiming protection for one’s rights, which in 
turn undermines equality of individuals that democracy posits as a foundational concept; 
however, eliminating economic inequality may carry the risk of destroying other 
individual rights in the process as it has been the case with communism6. The “death of 
ideologies” predicted after the fall of communism has not happened; economic 
recessions, persisting poverty, and increased crime are issues to be dealt with (Dalton 
1996, p. 330). In turn, uncertainty about the causes of those issues and the effectiveness 
or undesirable effects of policies opens the door to solutions prescribed by competing 
ideologies. Once again, ideologies compete and conflict in the policy arena the same way 
they conflict and compete at the institutional level. 
Reviewing the empirical evidence linking ideology with policy attitudes reveals 
how ideologies provide guidance and support for a broad range of political attitudes. For 
instance, ideology provides individuals with stable guidance on issue attitudes (Schneider 
and Jacoby, 2005). More specifically, differences in ideology explain individual 
differences on framing policy issues with conservatives presenting government spending 
                                                 
 
 
6 Another illustration comes from health policy – mandatory vaccination. It may curtail individual rights to 
refuse treatment but the benefits to accrue to society may only be reached when everybody is mandated to 
comply -vaccination of all t hat may be va ccinated may protect those who cannot receive the vaccine by 
limiting the possibility of contagion. 
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differently from the way liberals see it. Whereas the former emphasizes over-the-board 
reductions in spending – consistent with their view that government action is always 
negative - the latter emphasizes keeping aid to disadvantaged groups in society untouched 
– consistent with their standing towards reducing economic inequality (Jacoby 2000, p. 
3). Specifically, Schneider and Jacoby (2005) found that ideological positioning (liberal-
conservative) were significant predictors for individual attitudes towards welfare 
spending in the U.S.; the most conservative the individual the most opposed to welfare 
expenditure. Rudolph and Evans (2005) reported similar results not only for welfare 
spending but for other expenditure areas as well. Earlier studies found that ideological 
beliefs affect individual position on government issues more generally (Jacoby, 1990, 
1991). 
With empirical evidence supporting the role of ideologies in shaping individual 
attitudes on policy issues, the question becomes how ideology may influence Tax Morale. 
As with other issues, taxation and tax compliance shows divisions along ideological lines. 
Specifically, conservatives make a case for a limited government because they fear 
increased state power would threaten individual freedom (Rudolph and Evans, 2005); 
liberals on the other hand are less concerned with taxes and instead more focused on what 
is done with the resources extracted through taxation and how they may benefit 
disadvantaged groups (Jacoby, 2000). Through their “positive” and “normative” 
dimensions ideologies shape individual attitudes towards taxes as a correlate of shaping 
individual positions regarding government policy more generally. Wahlund (1992) 
studied factors that affected individual tax compliance and found that – among others -
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Swedish taxpayers who supported conservative parties were to evade more taxes than 
those not supporting them. 
Thus, we may enunciate the following hypothesis, 
             Individuals upholding views a limited role for government – congruent with 
conservative or right-wing ideological position - would have lower Tax Morale than 
those whose support a more active of government –consistent with liberal or left-
wing ideological beliefs. 
Policy implications if the hypothesis is empirically supported are straightforward. 
Governments should be aware that attempts to change individual attitudes towards taxes 
(or towards government more generally) may be mediated by the prevailing ideology 
among the citizenry. For instance, an electorate that holds a favorable view of 
government activities may help governments in implementing reforms (in taxation and in 
other fields), whereas individuals that uphold a negative view about government activities 
beyond protecting private property and individual rights would most likely resist any 
reform that is interpreted as increasing government intervention in society. Tax 
administration reforms in Spain during the 1980s provide an illustration of policy 
changes accomplished partially as result of positive view of individuals about those 
actions. On the one hand, the tax administration saw a doubling of its personnel (Onrubia 
2007)7, and the strong increase of Spain’s tax effort (tax intake almost doubled from the 
1970s to the early 1990s up to 40 percent of GDP) (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007) plus the 
                                                 
 
 
7 O nrubia, J . (2007). The Reform of t he Tax  A dministration i n S pain. Fi scal reform i n Spa in: 
accomplishments and challenges. J. Martinez-Vazquez and J. F. Sanz-Sanz. Cheltenham, UK;Northampton, 
MA, Edward Elgar: pp. 484-531. 
 68
introduction of new taxes such as the VAT. On the other hand, Spaniards’ ideological 
attitudes towards government were at the very least not opposed to those reforms; in fact, 
government activity was seen in a positive light regardless of individuals’ political and 
ideological loyalties (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina, 1998, pp. 63-64). Over time, 
however, those perceptions changed and by the 1990s public enthusiasm for government 
activism had disappeared. The important of ideology on tax compliance is highlighted by 
Wahlund findings that provided a link between individual ideological preferences and tax 
evasion. 
 
4.3. Support for Political Regimes and Tax Morale 
 
The literature reviewed in the previous chapter reported that higher individual 
support for democracy is associated with higher Tax Morale (Torgler 2003, Torgler and 
Schneider, 2007). Those results are interesting not only because of the findings in 
themselves but also that they may be part of a more general pattern, namely that 
individuals would exhibit higher Tax Morale when the political regime in place matches 
their regime preferences. For instance, an individual supportive of democratic regimes 
would have higher Tax Morale – as it was reported – when the regime under which s/he 
lives is democratic than if living under an authoritarian one. Conversely, individuals that 
support non-democratic regimes might exhibit higher Tax Morale when the regime in 
place is non-democratic. That possibility will be explored in the coming paragraphs. 
 
4.3.1. Measuring Individual Support for Political Regimes 
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In order to make a general case about alignment of individual regime preferences 
with the current regime in power as influencing Tax Morale, it is necessary to further 
elaborate on how to measure individual support for political regimes. Inglehart (2003) 
observed that measures of overt support for democracy included in well-known surveys 
like the World Values Survey show an almost unanimous support for democratic 
governments worldwide. However, when checking individual preference for competing 
political regimes, there is also a substantial level of support for non-democratic forms of 
government, which is even more notorious among those living in new democracies, 
hybrid regimes, or authoritarian ones. 
In his article, Inglehart illustrated his points using the proportion of respondents 
that reported support for different political systems in the 1999-2000 wave of the World 
Values Survey. The questions asked individual support for a democratic system8, a 
system ruled by strong leaders that do not have to put up with parliaments and elections 
and the last alternative is leave the military to rule9. Table 4.1 presents information 
similar to the one used by Inglehart’s article but from the most recent wave (2005-2008) 
of the World Values Survey. Survey respondents have been grouped by the three main 
categories of countries computed by the Freedom in the World Survey –Free countries, 
Partial Free, and Not Free countries; in addition, the best-scoring democracies have been 
placed in the first column. 
                                                 
 
 
8 That particular item has been used in the Tax Morale literature to measure individual support for 
democracy. 
9 The survey also includes a category of regimes where technocrats, not politicians, make the government 
decisions. In keeping with Inglehart’s decision I have not included it in the tables where I presented his 
findings using the last wave of the World Values Survey. 
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Table 4.1. Support for Different Political Systems (in %) 
Liberal 
Democracies Partial Free Not Free 
Freedom House Scores 1 1 to 2.5 3 to 5.5 6 to 7 
Having a Democratic Political System 
Very Good / Fairly Good 93 91 95 93
Fairly Bad / Very Bad 7 9 5 7
Having a strong leader that does not bother with Parliaments / Elections 
Very Good / Fairly Good 27 38 43 22
Fairly Bad / Very Bad 73 62 57 78
Having the Army Rule 
Very Good / Fairly Good 9 20 37 35
Fairly Bad / Very Bad 91 80 63 65




The figures displayed confirm Inglehart’s insights. For instance, the top third of 
table 4.1 shows an universal endorsement of democracy even among those living in 
countries that fall short of being democratic themselves (Partial Free and Not Free). The 
lower panels also show that support for competing political regimes questions individual 
commitment with democracy and with it the validity of the findings about the 
relationship between individual support for democracy and Tax Morale. To illustrate, a 
sizable proportion of individuals in liberal democracies (second column, 38 percent) that 
offered support for democracy north of 90 percent also consider very good or fairly good 
to have strong leaders that are not bothered with elections and parliaments, thus, plainly 
contradicting their support for democracy. Even among those living in the highest-
scoring democracies ranking the highest scores in the Freedom in the World Survey more 
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than a quarter supports non-democratic leaders that leave parliaments and elections aside.  
Moving down the scale of political and individual rights (Partial Free countries column) 
shows a larger proportion of individuals - 43 percent - supports rulers that are not subject 
to parliamentary or electoral accountability which makes look the 95 percent of support 
for democracy for the same individuals in those countries a very suspicious figure. What 
the figures reveal is that measuring support for democracy by using measures of overt 
support provides problematic results. 
Instead of discussing how to better measure individual support for democracy – a 
discussion that Inglehart offered in his article, I would instead pose a broader question, 
namely whether individual support for the political regime in place in a given country 
may affect Tax Morale. The earlier insight that individuals who supported democracy 
exhibited higher Tax Morale leaves outside several of the countries in the WVS that fall 
short of what a democratic regime is about – according to the Freedom in the World 
Survey. The crucial point is that for those individuals whose regime preferences favor the 
regime actually in office, it seems reasonable they would be more willing to comply with 
their taxes. To illustrate, individual support for democracy would only be relevant for 
individual Tax Morale when the regime under which the individual lives is democratic, 
and conversely individual support for democracy would lower Tax Morale if the political 
system is not democratic. The results linking support for democracy and Tax Morale 
follow that logic –the hypothesis has been tested with individuals coming from 
democratic countries – although in light of the problems with the measurement of support 
for democracy it may be necessary to re-evaluate. 
Consequently, we may test the following proposition, 
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Individuals who support a certain political regime are more likely to exhibit 
Tax Morale if their preferences are represented by the regime that actually rules in 
their countries. 
The implications of this hypothesis are straightforward. If individual beliefs 
support democracy and the prevailing governance system is itself democratic we would 
expect Tax Morale to be higher among those supporting that particular form of 
government. On the other hand, if individual beliefs do not correspond to those of the 
political system under which s/he lives, e.g. supporting democracy under an authoritarian 
system then we would expect Tax Morale to be low. It seems reasonable that individuals 
who support democracy and are forced to live under an authoritarian government to resist 
such situation by (among other things) cheating on their taxes (Torgler, 2003) 
Conversely, one way in which individuals would exhibit support for political system is by 
willingly paying their taxes. The case of large shifts in political regimes - such as 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy – seems more complex to elucidate. On the 
one hand, individuals that were supportive of the old system would be reluctant to lend 
their support to the new one and therefore less willing to voluntarily comply with their 
taxes. On the other hand, support for democracy may be arguably smaller – given the 
evidence we just reviewed – than for those living in consolidated democracies, but they 
may nonetheless be willing to support democracy with their taxes. Over time, support for 
the new regime may improve (if it is successful) by either changing the minds of those 
who supported the previous regime,  or by making new generation - raised under the new 
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system - develop loyalty to it without being influenced by the experiences of the old 
system. 
 
4.4. Post-Materialism and Tax Morale 
 
In the previous chapter we reviewed the finding that higher Tax Morale of older 
individuals has been explained as the result of them being more deeply “invested” on 
societal expectations, which increases the cost of dishonesty (Torgler, 2003b). By its part, 
lower Tax Morale among the best educated may be consequence of education giving 
them differential knowledge about ways to circumvent their tax responsibilities, or 
become more critical on how governments use tax revenues (Torgler, 2003b, p. 12). 
I would like to explore alternative explanations for some of those findings using 
developments in the literature on political support, especially Ronald Inglehart’s 
hypothesis on individual value change – post-materialism. The main point of post-
materialism is its assertion that changes in individual attitudes towards political 
institutions are consequence of changes in the underlying values upheld by individuals, 
which in turn are the result of the environment experimented by individuals during their 
formative years (adolescence and early adulthood). I will borrow those insights to 
hypothesize that the same process that leads to lower trust in political institutions for new 
cohorts of individuals may also explain the differences on Tax Morale between young 
and old individuals. In order to build how post-materialism would affect individual Tax 
Morale we need first to introduce how it affected individual attitudes towards institutions 




4.4.1. Patterns of Trust in Political Institutions 
 
The issue of declining support for institutions of representative democracy has 
occupied a prominent place in the literature since the 1970s (Dalton 1996, 1999, Norris 
1999) which gave rise to talks of a new era in politics - the “new politics” (Wenzel and 
Inglehart 2005, Dalton, Scarrow, and Cain 2004). Public confidence in institutions of 
representative democracy in advanced democracies – Europe, North America, and Japan 
–declined since the late 1960s in a well-documented phenomenon (Pharr, Putnam, and 
Dalton, 2000). However, the interpretations of the phenomenon changed over time. 
Initially, it was interpreted as one worrisome indication that support for democracy was at 
risk but later and better measures revealed that democracy as the ideal form of 
government has received overwhelming support (Norris, 1999, Dalton, 2005). In fact, a 
wave of democratization during the twentieth century expanded democracy as a form of 
government from a privilege enjoyed by a minority of the population to a mass 
phenomenon that empowered ordinary individuals with civil and political rights (Welzel 
and Inglehart, 2005). Moreover, no alternative to democracy is in the horizon, 
 “…in sharp contrast to the period after World War I, no serious 
intellectual or ideological challenge to democracy has emerged. Whether 
tracked over the more than five decades since the end of World War II 
or…since the fall of the Berlin Wall, opponents of democracy have lost 
support…” (Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton 2000, 9) 
 
Decline in confidence on institutions of representative democracy coexists with an 
increase in political participation. Confidence on pivotal institutions of representative 
democracy such as politicians, political parties, and parliaments has sharply declined 
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(Pharr, Putnam and Dalton, 2000). However, the growing disinterest and distrust in the 
representative side of politics (e.g. decreased voter turnout) is mirrored by an increase in 
using non-traditional channels for political participation. Individuals sign petitions, join 
special interest groups, engage in unconventional forms of political action (e.g. boycotts, 
protests), and favor expanded avenues for inputting their preferences into decision-
making (Dalton, Scarrow, and Cain, 2004). 
To summarize, confidence in institutions of representative democracy has 
decreased steadily during the past few decades although it has not meant the rejection of 
democratic ideals or democracy as being the best form of government. Instead, there is 
disenchantment with some aspects of representative democracy that coexists with new 
forms of participation in the political process. What remains to be explored is what has 
driven those changes among the public and whether they may also affect Tax Morale. 
 
4.4.2 Post-Materialist Value Change Hypothesis 
 
The process of declining confidence in institutions of representative democracy 
has been attributed to a shift in values upheld by individuals. Here, the hypothesis of 
post-materialist value change (Inglehart 1971, Inglehart and Flanagan 1987) provides a 
widely-used and debated hypothesis to explain individual value change in advanced 
democracies (Dalton, 1996). It has been used to explain a broad set of phenomena taking 
place in advanced democracies such as the rise of environmentalism, support for new 
social movements (women, minorities), and the ways individuals interact with the 
political system (Dalton, 1996). However, to the best of my knowledge, the only 
application of the post-materialist hypothesis to economic matters was done by Uhlaner 
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and Thurik (2006). They studied the relationship between entrepreneurship and post-
materialist values and found that upholding post-materialist values negatively impacted 
entrepreneurial activity and business formation rates. 
The model of value formation it provides is based on two premises (Dalton, 1996, Marks, 
1997), 
1. Value preferences reflect the environmental conditions the individual has 
experienced during his/her formative years 
2. Individual value change occurs because individuals value those things that are 
in short supply 
The set of values that individuals uphold develops in response to the environment 
–social, economic, and cultural- they experience during their youth/young adulthood 
years; once those values solidify they will remain relatively unchanged for the rest of 
their lives.  
To illustrate how individuals may change their values according to the 
circumstances of their upbringing, those who experienced the political turmoil of the 
1920s and 1930s, the Great Depression, and WWII, during their formative years would 
emphasize and uphold “material” values such as economic well-being. They would also 
appreciate a predictable authority - rule of law, and basic political and civil rights because 
those were in short supply even where democratic regimes were established10. To the 
extent that their material expectations were fulfilled, they would be willing to submit to 
those authorities; the higher willingness to comply with taxes –Tax Morale – among the 
                                                 
 
 
10 The case of the blacks in the U.S. is a direct illustration that even basic individual rights can be violated 
in an otherwise democratic political system. 
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oldest individuals may be one aspect of deference to authorities - a retribution for what 
governments delivered to them. 
The “baby boomer” generation offers an interesting contrast in terms of 
differences in values compared with the previous group. Growing up in the affluent and 
stable period after WWII meant that material needs were no longer pressing. Moreover, 
with basic civil and political rights ensured in most of Western Europe and North 
America, they were free to pursue new issues. Using the earlier generations’ 
achievements as a springboard, they started valuing other things such as environment 
protection, participatory democracy (Marks, 1997) improved quality of life, focus on 
social equality –e.g. gender equality and minorities rights -, and an increased desire for 
being part of the political decision making process (Davis and Davenport, 1999, Wenzel 
and Inglehart, 2005). However, because those new aspirations run counter to the 
established practices of representative democracy, the established authority was seen as 
guardians of the old order and therefore mistrusted and resisted11. With younger 
generations of taxpayers upholding values that make them see authorities with disdain 
and suspicion, and resentful for being given token voice in policy-making, it may not be a 
surprise that their tax compliance attitudes and behavior would be affected. 
Talking about a possible parallel process regarding tax compliance attitudes, 
recent evidence has found that younger individuals are more hostile to authorities 
(Braithwaite et al., 2010). What is perhaps more surprising is that attitudes towards tax 
                                                 
 
 
11 Stru ggles fo r in creasing particip ation in p olicymaking, o r g aining civ il rig hts for d isenfranchised 
minorities (women, or ethnic minorities) illustrate how new generations fight against what was estab lished 
norm to achieve their goals. 
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authorities and tax compliance do not change as taxpayers grow older. The study found 
that the attitudes towards tax authorities and tax compliance of those 30 years old and 
below are almost indistinguishable from those in the middle-aged (30-55) group. 
Inglehart (2008) reported a similar stability on post-materialist values since the 1970s; the 
rise on post-materialist values is linked to the increased proportion of post-materialists in 
developed democracies as the younger and less materialistic cohorts replaced the older 
ones in the population (Inglehart 2008, p. 136). Thus, as older, more trustful, and 
compliant individuals get progressively replaced by less trustful, less compliant and more 
cynical ones (Dalton, 2005) we may expect attitudes towards tax compliance and tax 
compliance itself to become more contentious. Individual value change may not 
necessarily mean lower Tax Morale and more tax evasion, however. 
Individuals may positively respond with higher tax compliance if authorities give 
them a more direct role in policy decisions. Feld and Frey (2002a) studied the behavior of 
Swiss taxpayers and whether their behavior was affected by institutions of direct 
democracy at the cantonal level. They found that the average size of tax evasion was 
lower for those cantons where institutions of direct democracy were more developed. 
Moreover, taxpayers reported feeling better treated by tax authorities in those same 
cantons. Because all Swiss citizens are exposed to institutions of participative democracy 
at the federal level, they may evaluate positively that their cantons provide them with the 
same or better instruments for participation and reciprocate with higher tax compliance 
when they are satisfied. 
What the theoretical findings derived from post-materialist value change 
hypothesis and the limited empirical evidence available suggest is that the “psychological 
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tax contract” among taxpayers and authorities proposed by Feld and Frey (2007) may 
need to be renegotiated. The contractual metaphor posited that individuals and tax 
authorities have rights and duties; if each side sticks to its side of the bargain, voluntary 
tax compliance emerged as result of increased trust and cooperation between the 
contracting parties. However, citizen/taxpayer expectations have changed since 
representative democracy was adopted in the 19th century, therefore making reasonable to 
assume that authorities may need to adjust their side of the bargain since the society it 
serves has changed (Dalton, 1999). In other words, tax authorities in particular and 
political authorities more generally may need to broaden the scope of individual 
participation in policy-making and expand their fair treatment of taxpayers to other areas 
as well if they want to keep taxpayers’ positive attitude towards compliance at a high 
level. 
We may therefore test the following proposition 
            Individuals holding post-materialist values are less likely to exhibit Tax  
Morale than individuals who uphold materialistic values. 
If testing results support the proposed hypothesis, it would provide an application 
of the post-materialist value change hypothesis to an issue - tax compliance – that lies 
beyond the hypothesis’ original scope. 
Policy implications of an empirically supported hypothesis are more difficult to 
elaborate. On the one hand, fostering a relationship of respect and trust between citizen-
taxpayers and authorities has been proposed and recommended as the most effective way 
to improve voluntary tax compliance (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). If newer 
generations of taxpayers are less trustful of authorities, it becomes less clear what may 
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happen with authorities’ appeal to individuals to trust government because those 
taxpayers are less willing to trust them. In those circumstances, a return to the old 
paradigm of deterrence and control, although possible, it would be counter-productive 
because it will reinforce individuals’ negative perceptions about tax authorities and 
perhaps alienate not only the new generations of taxpayers but also older generations as 
well. On the other hand, Feld and Frey’s study results suggest that governments may 
affect individual willingness to comply with taxes by giving taxpayers channels to 
influence policymaking more directly. Therefore, the kind of outcome that would emerge 
would be some kind of evolution about fostering trust and cooperation between taxpayers 
and authorities. 
Two other factors might mitigate the impact of post-materialist values on Tax 
Morale. One, individual value change may be slowing down because of the slowing in 
population growth. Inglehart (2008) finding that individual value change is driven by 
population replacement means that declining birth rates should slow down the shift 
towards post-materialist values. In addition, if the economic and political environment 
becomes more uncertain that may also affect individual value formation further slowing 
post-materialist shifts. 







Table 4.2. Summary of Hypotheses 
Trust In 
Government 
Individuals that trust the output organizations of government - courts, 
government bureaucracies, or law enforcement - would be more 
likely to exhibit Tax Morale than those who do not trust them. 
Ideology Individuals upholding views a limited role for the state in society – 
congruent with conservative or right-wing ideological position - 
would have lower Tax Morale than those whose support a more active 
role for state activity in different aspects of society’s life –consistent 
with liberal or left-wing ideological beliefs. 
Support for 
Democracy 
Individuals who support a certain political regime are more likely to 
exhibit Tax Morale if their preferences are represented by the regime 
that actually rules in their countries. 
Post-Materialism Younger individuals are less likely to exhibit Tax Morale than older 
ones because they are more likely to uphold post-materialist values. 
Overall, individuals holding post-materialist values are less likely to 










5.1. Data and Methods 
The proposed hypotheses will be tested using data from the last wave of the 
World Values Survey (WVS) collected from 2005 to 2008. Instead of focusing on a 
single country we will use individuals from several different countries (e.g. Alm and 
Torgler 2006, Torgler 2006) as we look for testing on as broad basis as possible. Working 
on individuals from different countries brings the issue of the accuracy of surveys across 
different languages, specifically the extent to which each version of the survey keeps with 
the original version’s intent. The team running the WVS controls the accuracy of surveys 
using the following method; the original questionnaires (written in English) are translated 
to the local language(s) by the team responsible for administering the survey in that 
country. The translated survey undergoes a second translation, from the local language(s) 
back into English made by a different translator. The local language(s) questionnaire(s) 
and the one(s) translated back into English are then sent to the central team that designs 
the main questionnaire for approval. By controlling local teams’ translations the 
deviations from the original may be contained and in this way the survey as a 
measurement instrument will remain constant across translations. 
There are a couple of issues that should be taken into account. First, when testing 
the first hypothesis that posits that trust in government is influenced by the actions of the 
output side of government - as opposed to the input side of government – it is necessary 
to control for other factors that may affect individual trust in government organizations. 
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In particular, the process leading to the appointment of representatives to input 
organizations (parliaments and the executive) should be scrutinized because it may affect 
individual trust in those organizations. If elections are not transparent because they are 
rigged to favor specific candidates or there are restriction on the candidates and/or 
political parties that may compete for public office, those representatives and the 
organizations to which they belong may not be trusted because of that circumstance12. To 
control for that possibility I would use the level of political rights and civil liberties 
enjoyed by individuals in those countries surveyed by the World Values Survey using the 
2006 edition of the Freedom in the World survey produced by Freedom House13. 
Although one possible limitation of using this particular survey is that it reflects liberal 
notions of democracy (Norris, 2008), it is also true that such notion of liberal democracy 
is the one that is followed by the advanced western democracies, and several of the newly 
established democracies in Eastern Europe and the older ones in Latin America also 
follows that ideal (although the extent to which they achieve it may be matter for 
discussion). 
Back to the Freedom in the World survey, it ranks most of the countries in the 
world on political rights and civil liberties  producing a single number in a scale from 1 to 
7, where the lower the score the higher the degree of political rights and civil liberties. 
                                                 
 
 
12 We do not know for sure whether the measure of trust in parliament measures trust in the institution or in 
those who populate it (Citrin 1974) 
13 The survey assesses a coun try’s level of political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by their inhabitants 
based on questionnaires that score how they perform on political rights and civil liberties. Each dimension 
generates a rank from 1 to 7 which lower values meaning higher degree of political and civil rights. 
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From those ranking numbers, Freedom House groups countries in three defined 
categories, 
• Free countries with a combined score between 1 and 2.5. Those living in those 
countries enjoy the largest degree of political rights and civil liberties 
• Partial Free countries scoring between 3 and 5. Individuals living in those 
countries face some stronger limitations to their political rights and civil 
liberties although in some cases those may not be due to government action 
(e.g. civil war, internal unrest) 
• Not Free countries scoring from 5.5 through 7. Individuals living in those 
countries have little to no rights and freedoms 
Second, given the uneven situation in the exercise of individual rights and 
freedoms across the countries that form the WVS, it may be possible that in those places 
where individual rights and freedoms are curtailed individual answers to survey questions 
may be affected by the perceived threat that some answers may bring to the respondent. 
Because of those two circumstances I will separate the WVS survey in different sets of 
countries as described in the coming paragraphs. 
The first group will use individuals from the Free countries (combined rating of 







Table 5.1 List of Free countries  
Germany 
(East/West)* 
Italy* Spain* Canada* 
Australia* Norway* Sweden* Finland* 
Poland* Switzerland* Chile* Slovenia* 
Taiwan* Uruguay* Cyprus* United States* 
Japan South Africa South Korea Bulgaria 
Mexico Brazil India Romania 
Ukraine Indonesia Serbia Mali 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
   




In the countries listed in Table 5.1., individuals enjoy a broad array of political 
rights and civil liberties that do not impinge on the legitimacy of those selected by public 
office and also provides a fair degree of confidence that their survey responses would not 
be influenced by fear of expressing their views. 
In addition, two additional set of regressions will be run. A second run will 
include only those individuals coming from what Freedom House survey qualifies as 
Partial Free countries in their survey (those with ratings between 3 and up to 5), and those 




Table 5.2 List of Partial Free and Not Free Countries  
Turkey Moldova Georgia Thailand 
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Zambia  
China # Vietnam #   
Source: 2005-2008 World Values Survey, 2006 Freedom in the World Survey 
 
 86
One possible issue would be the extent to which empirical results may represent 
the situation of Tax Morale in those countries. Because of the diminished status of 
individual rights and freedoms in those countries, survey responses may be biased 
because of fear of getting into trouble with authorities and instead providing an 
“adequate” answer instead of what they really think or believe. Even with that limitation 
in mind, those countries engage in tax reform to improve tax administration, increase tax 
revenue and reduce tax evasion; because of that it is still useful to examine what happens 
in those countries in terms of their taxpayers’ Tax Morale even in the light of those 
potential issues. 
The last set of regressions will restrict the set of Free countries in Table 5.1 to 
those with the best ranking in political rights and civil liberties (identified with an 
asterisk). That subset includes the developed countries of Western Europe and North 
America. In addition for that arrangement being necessary for testing the fourth 
hypothesis about post-materialist values and Tax Morale (the post-materialist value 
change hypothesis was proposed for individuals in advanced industrial democracies that 
is those with both high level of rights and freedoms, and high levels of economic 
development) it carries the additional interest to see the extent to which the results match 
(or diverge from) those obtained from the broader Free countries category. 






5.2.1 Dependent variable: Tax Morale. 
 
To measure individual willingness to comply with taxes, I will use the same 
question from the World Values Survey that has been used in many of the earlier studies 
reviewed. That question asks individual justifiability or not of engaging in certain 
behaviors, among which cheating on taxes is asked as follows; 
“Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between (1-10 
scale: 1: “never justifiable; 10: always justifiable)” 
“Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” (V200) 
 
Among the shortcomings of using a self-reported answer to assess one’s level of 
Tax Morale the most prominent one is that individual answers to the question may not 
correlate with tax behavior. Some individuals may want to make up for past behavior by 
asserting high Tax Morale in survey responses; there are not observable measures of Tax 
Morale (Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009). However, a similar disconnection 
between attitudes and behavior besets the neoclassical model of tax evasion. Consider the 
assumption that individuals cheat on their taxes to profit from it. Empirical testing of the 
model has assumed it as true, but data on tax non-compliance is used to empirically test 
the model. Observed non-compliance may be attributed to misinterpretation of tax laws 
or lack of resources when filing out one’s taxes (Braithwaite et al, 2009) and not simply 
to a deliberate intention of cheating. To put it differently, Tax Morale is no more difficult 
to measure (or more problematic) than the cheating intentions assumed to motivate non-
compliant behavior in the neoclassical model. In any event, Tax Morale may not be 
constructed as an absolute mandate. It would not be reasonable to expect that individuals 
would uphold Tax Morale and voluntarily pay their taxes if the government collecting 
them is illegitimate; individuals would resist it by withholding their taxes (Torgler 2002) 
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Although the direct relationship between Tax Morale and compliant behavior has yet to 
be developed in detail, average levels of Tax Morale in a country have been shown to 
relate with the country’s size of the underground economy which in turn has been 
interpreted as the impact of Tax Morale on tax evasion (Torgler and Schneider 2007, Alm 
and Torgler 2006). 
Another objection to the question is that individuals may want to redeem 
themselves for past non-compliant behavior and report higher Tax Morale than they 
really have. However, the way the question is being asked in the World Values Survey 
does not intrude by asking individual behavior directly. Moreover, the item asking about 
the degree of justifiability of cheating on taxes is one among a block of several other 
items including items as disparate as the justifiability of homosexuality, divorce, 
accepting bribes, euthanasia, and suicide. Given the question’s eclectic array of topics 
covered, its place in the survey questionnaire (about mid-way) and the general matters 
covered in it, it seems unlikely that respondents may be able to be guarded about that 
specific question in order to save face before the interviewer. Other issues, such as the 
problems derived from using a single question to measure Tax Morale are counter-
balanced by the difficulties in assembling indexes in terms of correlation among 
components and deciding on the relative importance (weights) of each component 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009) 
A brief inspection at the proposed measure for Tax Morale taken from the WVS 
shows that there is a clear cut-off point once the question takes on values larger than one 






Figure 5.1 Tax Morale. Survey Answers 
 (1: never justifiable) 
 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that others who find cheating on taxes somewhat justifiable 
place themselves somewhere between 2 and 9 (about 38 percent of respondents), whereas 
those for whom cheating on taxes is always justifiable are coded with the number 10. 
Because of that, the dependent variable would be re-coded to express – with the number 1 
- those who find cheating on taxes never justifiable, and zero otherwise. An additional set 
of regressions using the original variable will be estimated, and the results of both sets 
will be compared side to side.  
Because we are interested in what makes an individual most likely to report that 
he would not justify cheating, a non-linear estimation method is advisable to avoid the 
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problems of using linear estimation techniques in such contexts - predicted probabilities 
may become negative (Kennedy, 1993). Previous empirical work has used different types 
of  Probit estimation to keep with the nature of the dependent variable – (binomial and 
ordinal) (Wooldridge, 2002). Furthermore, weights will be used to reflect a country’s 
share of population 
 
5.2.2 Main Independent Variables. 
 
Frist, the variables used to test each proposed hypothesis – trust in government, 
ideology, support for democracy, and post-materialism – will be introduced; all the other 
control variables to be used will follow after that. Table 5.3 lists the hypotheses, the 
proposed measures with their reference to the World Values Survey, its scale, and the 













Table 5.3. List of Independent Variables 
Independent 
variable  




(v141) Trust in Civil Service 
(v136) Trust in Police 
(v137) Trust in Courts and Justice 
System 
(v140) Trust in Parliament 
4-point ( + ) 
Ideology (v116) Income Inequality 
(v118) Individual Responsibility 
10-point ( - ) 
Support for 
Democracy 
Rejection of Non-democratic 
alternatives 
(v148) ruled by strong leaders 
(v149) ruled by experts 
(v150) ruled by the military 




variables recoded into 
accept/reject) 
( + ) 
Post-Materialism (y001) 12-item Post-materialist 
index 
 
6-point ( - ) 
Other variables (v186) Religiosity (attendance to 
services) 
(v209) National Pride (pride in 
one’s nationality) 
 ( + ) 
 
( + ) 
Controls (v235)   Female (gender) 
(v237)   Age 
(v238)   Education 
(v253)   Income 
(v55)    Marital status 
(v241)  Employment Status 
Country-specific dummies 
 ( + ) 
( + ) 
varies 







5.2.2.1 Trust in Government 
 
It has been hypothesized that individuals form their evaluations of trust in 
government at the way its output organizations treat them in their daily dealings with 
them, such as delivery of public goods and services, getting protections for their rights, 
and how individuals are treated by those organizations whose task is detecting and 
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punishing deviant behavior. Consequently, I will use variables measuring individual 
degree of trust in government organizations. All the questions dealing with trust in 
government organizations in this section share the same text and we will include the 
specific item from the World Values Survey that is being included, 
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you 
tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at 
all? (4-scale item, coded 1=a great deal… 4=none at all)” 
 
We will measure individual trust in government by using four different measures 
each corresponding with a specific area of government (the question number in the WVS 
is also included between parenthesis) 
Trust in the Civil Service (V141). Individuals go before government 
bureaucracies in order to get their share of goods and services –health, education, social 
services, and so on. We have hypothesized that to the extent that those organizations treat 
individuals according to the principles of procedural justice they will be trusted. 
Conversely, if individuals are mistreated when they interact with public bureaucracies 
that deliver public goods and services they would not trust them. I would expect a 
positive coefficient meaning a higher degree of trust in the civil service will increase an 
individual’s Tax Morale. One potential issue that may undermine the usefulness this 
measure is the extent to which “civil service” captures individual experience with the 
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output side of government; using measures of trust in specific organizations (e.g. school 
system or social welfare) would be a better alternative14. 
Trust in Police (V136). Its role is protecting individuals’ lives and patrimony, 
detecting deviant behavior, and capturing those suspected of infringing legal norms to 
later process by the courts. In performing those roles, the police should behave according 
to principles of procedural fairness. Protection of individuals’ lives and patrimony should 
be provided without exception, and in capturing potential criminals they should exhibit 
the same concern for the individual’s rights that for those that seek its protection. We 
expect a positive relationship between trust in police and Tax Morale; with higher degree 
of confidence in police eliciting higher Tax Morale. Unlike the previous variable, the 
functions of police (and their malfunctions) are far more uniform across countries so we 
do not have a priori concerns about this particular measure of trust in government 
Trust in Courts (V137). The role of the courts and legal system in eliciting 
individual Tax Morale has been hypothesized in previous studies which found empirical 
evidence of its significance; individuals trusting courts were more likely to report 
considering tax cheating as never justifiable. Moreover, our hypothesis contemplates that 
courts may affect individual Tax Morale because of the way their tasks should be carried 
out (in accordance with procedural fairness/justice considerations). One possible issue 
with this measures concerns to the extent to which individuals get exposed and involved 
                                                 
 
 
14 Even if we were to have measures of individual trust from several output organizations, we have no way 
to ascertain the relativ e relev ance of each in  sh aping i ndividual Ta x Morale; n ot only beca use different 
individuals may interact with different agencies but also because the international basis of the WVS means 
different government arrangements and different functions. For instance, healthcare in the U.S. is provided 
mainly by private providers with little o r no intervention from the government, whereas in many Western 
European c ountries, C anada, and Ja pan, t he arra ngements i nclude g overnment orga nizations i n var ied 
degrees. 
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with the legal system and courts. Unlike law enforcement (police) with which individuals 
interact directly or indirectly (by observation of their behavior) the extent to which the 
common citizen may get involve with courts is limited to those with affairs to settle either 
because of being accused of norm violations, or because of interest conflicts with another 
private party. 
Trust in Parliament (V140). The review of the literature in chapter 2 showed 
that individuals trusting Parliaments are more likely to report higher Tax Morale, and 
explained on the grounds that parliaments may elicit trust from taxpayers when delivering 
what taxpayers want. One issue to note, however, is the concern with the meaning of 
measures of trust in political institutions that may be found in the political trust literature. 
Specifically, those measures may gauge individual trust in the institution, trust in 
incumbents, or something else entirely (Citrin, 1974)15. This particular issue has not been 
discussed before but it is nevertheless relevant. In any event, if the proposed hypothesis is 




The hypothesis contends that those who see taxes and government actions as 
detrimental for society (commonly defined as conservative or right-leaning positions) 
would have lower Tax Morale than those who see government actions in a positive way 
(liberal or left-leaning positions). Ideology provides individuals with clues to understand 
                                                 
 
 
15 Citrin, J. (1974). "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government." The American Political 
Science Review 68(3): 973-988. 
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the world and how individuals should deal with it (Denzau and North, 1994) and it has 
shown to influence individual attitudes on policy issues, particularly government 
spending (e.g. Jacoby, 1991 1994; Rudolph and Evans, 2005) – less support to 
government spending among those upholding conservative views. Therefore, I expect 
individuals upholding conservative views to exhibit lower Tax Morale than those 
upholding liberal positions. 
There are different possibilities regarding how to measure ideology. One 
possibility would be using a measure asking respondents to locate themselves along the 
left-right continuum, which is available in the WVS (coded v114). Some issues that may 
arise from using such a measure would be potential for respondents’ biases that would 
make them to avoid placing themselves in positions that are perceived as negative even if 
those are the ones they feel identified with. Another possible limitation of using that 
measure consists that given the cross-country nature of the WVS what is “left” or “right” 
may not mean the same among individuals in different countries. 
Another possibility for measuring individuals’ ideology would be using their 
party affiliation or support. Party allegiance or identification has been shown to be 
important when deciding an individuals’ position on issues they do not know that much 
about. They use the party’s position on the matter to decide their own (Jacoby, 1988). 
Although it looks as a promising possibility, there are technical issues that prevent it from 
using it here. In order to use individuals’ party allegiances as a measure for ideology, it is 
necessary to code the different party choices along the left-right continuum for each 
country included in the WVS that becomes part of the estimation. In two or three-party 
systems (e.g. the UK or the U.S.) it is straightforward; however, where multi-party 
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systems are in place (e.g. France, Germany, Italy), or where parties’ ideological positions 
may shift over time16 it may become particularly time-consuming to develop. 
The third alternative uses separate but related variables that tap into individual 
ideology (Jacoby 1995, p. 315) without explicitly mentioning “right” or “left” or 
ideology. One such measure was used by Evans et al. (1996); they used several questions 
to establish individual left-right ideology to predict individual support for candidates in 
the UK. Some of those questions are included in the World Values Survey (WVS), 
 “Now, I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would 
you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement 
on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose 
any number in between” (10-point scale) 
 
Unlike Evans et al. where the different elements were combined to form a left-
right index, the two items to be used to measure an individual’s level of ideology will be 
used separately. Those elements are, 
 
 
Table 5.4. Ideology. Measurement 
(Question #) / 
variable “Left” “Right” 
(V116) Income 
Inequality 
Incomes should be made more 
equal 
We need larger income 




The government should take 
more responsibility to ensure 
that everyone is provided for 
People should take more 
responsibility to provide for 
themselves 
 
                                                 
 
 
16 To illustrate, Argentina’s Peronist party in the 1990s shifted away from its interventionist roots to 




Both items refer to issues that are salient among the left-right dimension; on the 
one hand, whether income differences between individuals should be left unchecked – a 
position uphold by the right because of concerns of government action encroaching on 
individual freedoms – or instead should be reduced through government action. On the 
other hand, whether governments should become more involved in ensuring individual 
well-being – position upheld by the left – instead of leaving individuals to fend off 
themselves. We expect that individuals whose answers lean closer to the “right” of the 
ideological spectrum in each of those questions would be less likely to exhibit Tax 
Morale because they favor a limited role for government in society translated into low 
taxes and less government involvement in the private sphere. 
 
5.2.2.3 Support for Political Regimes 
 
Given the issues with measures of overt support for democracy, I will follow the 
approach introduced by Linde (2009). He measured individual support for democracy in 
former communist countries of Eastern Europe by measuring whether individuals support 
non-democratic government alternatives; an individual that rejects all non-democratic 
regime alternatives is interpreted as supportive of the democratic system (Linde 2009, 
12). The same coding that Linde used for the variable will be used; a value of one means 
the individual has rejected all non-democratic government alternatives, and zero 
otherwise (s/he supports at least one non-democratic regime alternative). I expect that 
individuals who reject all non-democratic government alternatives would be most likely 
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to exhibit Tax Morale the political regime they experience is itself democratic. 
Conversely, I would expect individuals who support democracy but live under 
authoritarian regimes to exhibit their discontent by exhibiting lower Tax Morale. 
It is more difficult to predict the impact of support for democracy on Tax Morale 
for those living under political regimes that fall short of democracy – defined by the 
Freedom in the World survey as Partial Free countries – but also short of outright 
dictatorships. In principle, I would expect that if they prefer non-democratic regimes, 
their Tax Morale might be higher because it seems reasonable to provide support to the 
political system they favor. However, in those countries there may be several elements of 
democratic systems but they face significant shortcomings or limitations (or those may 
become completely absent). For instance, there may be elections but they fall short of the 
democratic ideal because there may be coercion, intimidation, electoral fraud, 
government-controlled media, and plain physical threats (Norris, 2008) or proscription of 
candidates and/or political parties. On the one hand, individuals who support democracy 
may exhibit higher Tax Morale out of the hope the system would eventually improve. On 
the other hand, they may exhibit lower Tax Morale because they are fully aware of the 
limitations and instead of hope for improvement they want to withhold support for a 
regime that falls short of their expectations. 
In assembling the “rejection of non-democratic alternatives” variable, Linde 
(2009) used four items that was adequate for the Eastern European environment - return 
to communist rule, having the army rule, strong man rule, and suspension of parliament 
and abolition of parties. The World Values Survey (WVS) also measures the extent of 
individual support for different political regimes, as follows, 
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“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you 
think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would 
you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of 
governing this country?” (4-point questions) 
 
 
Table 5.5 Support for Political Regimes 
Item # (WVS) Measure 
V148 Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliaments 
and elections 
V149 Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what 
they think is best for the country 
V150 Having the army rule 




Because of the issues with overt measures of support for democracy (Inglehart, 
2003) the last item will not be used. Talking about the other items, exhibiting support for 
leaders that do not care about parliaments and elections implies rejection of democratic 
principles, namely the legitimacy of access to office via free and fair elections, and that 
the leader can delete the division of powers between government branches by 
subordinating the other branches to his authority; some call the later principle horizontal 
accountability (O’Donnell, 1998). Empirically, this measure appears correlated with 
lower levels of political and civil liberties at the aggregate level (Rose and Mishler, 1996, 
Inglehart, 2003). 
The second item gauges preference for being rule by experts (technocrats). This 
measure is a little more complex to interpret. On the one hand, although it may be 
associated with support for a non-democratic form of government, what constitutes 
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“expert advice” or “expertise” is subject of debate in the literature on regime support. For 
instance, a reform-oriented government may source economic advice from several 
competing sources besides neo-classical economics. Moreover, the choice of economic 
expertise may vary according to specific views on the kinds of expertise needed, the 
goals to be achieved, and its cost for the population (Rose and Mishler, 1996). On the 
other hand, Inglehart (2003) reported a statistical correlation between aggregate scores to 
this question and long-term averages of country rankings in the Freedom House index; 
higher preference for expertise ruling is correlated with lower level of political rights and 
civil liberties. 
Finally, talking about having the army rule as preferred political regime it may be 
said that, military governments have been commonplace in certain parts of the world (e.g. 
Latin America and some Asian countries). In the communist countries of Eastern Europe, 
however, the military was tightly controlled to ensure loyalty to the regime - special 
police forces exerted control over society. The military was the last defense when civil 
unrest threatened the government; internal or external military intervention (the latter by 
the former Soviet Union army and other eastern satellites) brought civil unrest to an end 
(Hungary and former Czechoslovakia). Because the military appeared one way or another 
associated with non-democratic regime alternatives I have included it as another item to 
measure individual commitment with democracy. 
 
5.2.2.4 Post-Materialist Values 
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In order to test whether post-materialist values influence individual willingness to 
comply with taxes, the12-item version of the index included in the World Values Survey 
will be used. Coded on a six-point scale; higher values mean higher level of individual 
post-materialist values. Survey respondents are asked to choose two items - one item as 
the most important for them, and then the second most important -  one out of a list of 
four items; the same situation is repeated two more times in the same fashion. The 
questions are of the following form, 
“If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say 
is most important?...And which would be the next most important?” 
 
Table 5.6 displays the three sets of items (one per column) that respondents are 
asked to choose when questioned about values they uphold. 
 
 
Table 5.6 Post-Materialist Value Index  
Questions (1st set) Questions (2nd set) Questions (3rd set) 
A high level of economic 
growth 
Maintaining order in the 
nation 
A stable economy 
Making sure this country 
has strong defense forces 
Giving people more say in 
important government 
decisions (*) 
Progress toward a less 
impersonal and more 
humane society (*) 
Seeing that people have 
more say about how things 
are done at their jobs and 
in their communities (*) 
Fighting rising prices Progress toward a society 
in which Ideas count more 
than money (*) 
Trying to make our cities 
and countryside more 
beautiful (*) 
Protecting freedom of 
speech (*) 
The fight against crime 
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For the first column (questions V69-70) individuals choosing the options marked 
with asterisks are considered post-materialists; those who pick the unmarked items are 
labeled materialists, and those choosing one marked and one unmarked item are labeled 
as mixed-valued. Similar criteria apply for the remaining two columns. In turn, individual 
answers are combined to produce the six-point scale commented earlier. I expect that the 
higher the individual scores in the post-materialist scale, the less likely for the individual 
to report Tax Morale. 
 
5.2.3. Other Independent Variables 
 
In addition to the independent variables measuring the different hypotheses, other 
variables that have shown to affect individual Tax Morale in previous studies will be also 
included. Those are included below. 
Religiosity (V186). It measures individual involvement with formal religion by 
gauging attendance to religious services. The impact expectation coming from earlier 
studies posits that individuals who reported being religious exhibited higher Tax Morale 
than those who were not religious. 
National Pride (V209). Individuals reporting being proud of their nationality 
were more likely to report willingness to comply with taxes. 
Other variables used customarily as controls will also be included, 
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Age (V237). Earlier studies found that older individuals are more likely to exhibit 
Tax Morale than younger ones. Unlike other studies in which individuals’ age was 
recoded to fit different categories, here it will be used as collected in the WVS. 
Gender (V235). Women (coded 1) are more likely to have Tax Morale compared 
to men (baseline) 
Marital status (V55). Married individuals have been found more likely to have 
Tax Morale than singles, or divorced ones. Dummy variables will be created for all 
married categories other than married, which will be used as baseline. 
Education (V238). The original variable in the WVS will be recoded and turned 
into binary variables to reflect completeness of each level of study –elementary, and 
tertiary- or no education. Secondary education (incomplete or complete) will be used as 
baseline (all other education variables equal to zero). Previous studies have found that the 
higher the educational attainment the lower the Tax Morale; this result has been 
explained as education opening the doors to more sophisticated way to evade taxes. On 
the other hand, higher education could also make more evident for the individual on the 
benefits derived from government actions. 
Employment status (V241). Previous studies have found that unemployed 
individuals were less likely to have Tax Morale when compared with full-time ones. 
Dummy variables will be created for the different employment categories described in the 
WVS; unemployed, partially employed, student, stay at home individuals, retired, and so 
on. Full-time employed individuals will be the baseline (all other employment variables 
equal to zero) 
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Income (V253). The variable collects the self-reported income levels on 10-decile 
scale (a value of 1 corresponds to the lowest decile and 10 to the highest decile). 
Individuals with higher incomes were reported to be less likely to exhibit Tax Morale, 
which has been explained as the result that at higher income levels and in the presence of 
progressive income taxes, individuals may have an increased reward from cheating. I 
expect a similar result when testing the hypotheses. 
Country Variables. In order to account for unobserved factors related to 
characteristics pertaining to the respondents;’ countries (e.g. culture, traditions), dummy 
variables representing the respondents’ place of residence will be included. For each set 
of countries for which the model will be run there would be a different baseline country 








6.1 Individuals from Free Countries 
 
The first set of results obtained from individuals coming from countries defined as 
Free by Freedom House are presented in Table 6.1 below. Models 1 through 3 test the 
hypothesis about trust in government and Tax Morale; 4 through 6 test the results for the 
ideology hypothesis while models 7 and 8 do the same for the third and fourth 
hypotheses. Model 9 actually provides the results for the full model; the last column (10) 
computes the marginal effects for the full model. Marginal effects provide a more 
straightforward way to gauge the size of the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable; Probit coefficients merely state the impact on the z-scores of the 
dependent variable when the independent variable increases by one unit (In our case, 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































With regards to the first hypothesis, the full model (#9) support the expectation 
that individual trust in government is shaped by government organizations on the output 
side of government. Both Trust in Civil Service and Trust in Police are statistically 
significant (5 percent level and 1 percent level respectively) and show the expected 
positive sign. Higher trust in those organizations make individuals more likely report that 
they would never justify cheating on their taxes even if they were to have the chance. 
Looking at the strength of the relationship, using the marginal effects (#10) show that one 
unit increase in Trust in Police increases the probability of reporting Tax Morale by 1.85 
percent, whereas one unit increase in trust in civil service increases the probability of 
reporting that cheating on taxes is never justifiable by about 1.2 percent, holding all other 
variables at their mean values. Even though the effects are arguably small, they are 
similar to others obtained earlier on similar multi-country settings (e.g. Torgler, 2005a, b) 
Interestingly, neither Trust in Justice nor Trust in Parliament influence individual 
Tax Morale. Even though they had been found to be statistically significant in earlier 
studies, when placed together with the variables measuring trust in output government 
organizations they would be no longer become statistically significant. Thus, the 
mechanism behind the hypothesis - that individuals come to trust government out of the 
treatment received at the end of government where public goods and services are 
delivered -receives empirical support. In other words, individuals assess whether to trust 
government by the way its agencies exercise their powers over the citizenry, that is they 
assess government legitimacy by the way it exercises its power (Rothstein 2009, 
Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). 
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The results give additional support to the suggestion that building a relationship of 
trust and cooperation between taxpayers and authorities may improve individual tax 
compliance (Alm, 1999, Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). They also suggest building 
compliant attitudes among taxpayers may be a task to be accomplished not only by the 
tax administration but also may be affected by other government agencies. Thus, a 
government that wants to improve tax compliance attitudes (and compliance with legal 
norms in general) should treat individuals in ways consistent with principles of 
procedural justice; in return, individuals would be more likely to reciprocate such 
treatment and become more willing to comply with their taxes and government norms in 
general. One interesting thing to notice comes from looking at columns 1 through 3. Trust 
in Justice was statistically significant when none of the proposed trust variables were 
present, but when they were included (model 3) Trust in Courts was no longer 
statistically significant, and Trust in Parliament was statistically significant (10 percent 
level) but with a negative sign that contradicted earlier results. By contrast, Trust in 
Police always exhibited the expected sign and was statistically significant. 
One final topic to address concerns the lack of statistical significance for the Trust 
in Courts variable commented in the previous paragraph. Although it seems to contradict 
the hypothesis’ basic postulate that trust in government is primarily built on its output 
side –the role of justice system is delivering justice to individuals – the lack of statistical 
significance may be also the result of individuals being more likely to interact with other 
government organizations – such as the Police - than with Courts. Individuals are most 
likely to interact with police forces or observe their behavior than to experience an 
interaction with courts except for the cases in which individuals become part in a trial. 
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Therefore, although all government organizations in the output side may affect individual 
trust in government with their actions, the degree to which they interact with taxpayers 
would indicate which ones may be more likely to affect evaluations of trust in 
government. 
Talking now about the effects of individuals’ ideology on their Tax Morale, the 
results from the sample of individuals from free countries provide some support for the 
hypothesis that individuals’ ideological leanings may influence their willingness to 
comply with taxes. Individuals that believe strongly that people should take care of 
themselves – a position associated with conservative or right-wing ideology were less 
likely to exhibit Tax Morale; the coefficient is statistically significant at the five percent 
level. Looking at the marginal effects, however, reveals that the strength of the impact of 
ideological beliefs on Tax Morale is quite small; one point increase on preference for 
Individual Responsibility decreases the probability of reporting Tax Morale by 0.1 
percentage points holding all other independent variables at their means. Moreover, the 
second measure used for gauging individuals’ ideology – individual opinion regarding 
income inequality – is not statistically significant, something that may also be observed 
from the partial models 4 through 6. Despite the very small size of the impact, one issue 
about ideology may put it on a different light compared to trust in government. Unlike 
individual evaluations of trust in government, ideological beliefs may be more 
impervious to government influence; in turn, population’s underlying beliefs on how 
society and the state should be organized may either facilitate or obstruct government 
action regarding taxation. Again, we will carry out more testing to see whether those 
insights derived from liberal democracies (free countries) are also relevant in other 
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contexts. As with the previous hypothesis, more results will come from individuals in 
Partial Free and Not Free countries, and in the most advanced democracies to confirm or 
deny the results obtained so far. 
Before presenting the results for the hypothesis about support for political regimes 
(in this case democracy) and its relationship with Tax Morale, I would introduce some 
descriptive information derived from the variable used to measure individual support for 
democracy originally developed by Linde (2009) as a way to contrast the information 
introduced in Chapter 3 regarding support for democracy in the World Values Survey. 




Table 6.2. Support for Democracy stratified by Freedom House survey scores (1) 
 Free Countries Partial Free Not Free 
 Best scores All  
Not support 57.9 68.1 82.6 61.2 
Support For Democracy 42.1 31.9 17.4 38.8 
Observations 17,681 32,343 11,264 2,038 
(1): coded by using rejection for non-democratic alternatives variable 




The Freedom in the World Survey has been used to separate WVS’s respondents 
into three categories. The first two columns measures support for democracy among 
individuals from free countries – the first only counts those who got the highest scores for 
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individual rights and freedoms, and the second includes also those from other free 
countries. 
A quick glance at Table 6.2 shows that, unlike the consistently very high degree 
of support for democracy using measures of overt support for democracy, a pattern of 
declining support parallels the decline of individual rights and freedoms measured by the 
Freedom in the World survey. Thus, among those from the best scoring free countries, 
support for democracy (rejecting of all non-democratic regime alternatives) tops at about 
42 percent; when broadening the sample to consider individuals from all countries 
meeting the free definition in the Freedom in the World Survey, support for democracy 
falls to about a third of all respondents (32 percent). For those living in Partial Free 
countries, support for democracy is even smaller standing at about 17 percent. However, 
declining support for democracy increases when measuring individuals living in not free 
countries (about 38 percent). Given the situation of rights and freedoms in those countries 
– where personal opinions that diverge from the government’s official ones may put 
individuals in trouble with authorities – the results might reflect individuals’ reporting the 
official view regarding how the political regime should be considered in those countries. 
Another possibility would be that the meaning individuals give to the concept of 
democracy might differ to a substantial extent from the meaning given to it in the other 
countries. 
The figures also show that, when measured that way, individual support for 
democracy is less widespread than suggested by measures of overt support listed on 
Chapter 3. Although the low figures for support for democracy suggest that the measure 
may underestimates the extent of real support for democracy, the measure nevertheless 
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provides a solid lower bound – a “hard core” - of support for democratic principles and 
practices - that in turn may be more reliable when testing the relationship between 
support for democracy and Tax Morale. Moreover, because the measure also includes 
support for non-democratic regime alternatives it may allow – for the first time – to 
explore whether supporting non-democratic government alternatives may affect Tax 
Morale for those living under those regimes. 
Talking now about whether individual support for democracy (measured as 
rejection of non-democratic government alternatives) affects Tax Morale, the results 
shows support for democracy increases the probability of reporting Tax Morale with the 
variable being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The strength of the 
relationship, on the other hand, it is better seen by considering the marginal effects, 
which indicates that the impact of one unit change in the support for democracy variable 
(that is, going from accepting at least one non-democratic political regime to rejecting all 
non-democratic alternatives) increases the likelihood of reporting Tax Morale by about 7 
percentage points. The results thus confirm that one part of the proposed hypothesis is 
supported when tested among living in democratic regimes, namely that when individuals 
uphold preferences for democratic regimes and the regime in place is democratic, they 
become more willing to sustain the current regime by paying their taxes. 
The results confirm earlier results – using a different measure – that individual 
support for democracy increases Tax Morale. However, in order to fully test the 
hypothesis, it is necessary to see whether it holds also when considering individuals 
living in countries that fall far from the democratic ideal. Specifically, it would allow to 
test whether support for non-democratic regimes increases the Tax Morale of those living 
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under non-democratic regimes. It may be the case that only democratic regimes may 
promote Tax Morale when they perform well because of the “goods” provided to the 
citizenry – individual rights and freedoms. Alternatively, it may also be possible that 
supporters of non-democratic regimes living in system different from a democracy may 
focus more narrowly on receiving from government material goods and be less concerned 
about individual rights and freedoms. 
In presenting the results for the last hypothesis – the impact of post-materialist 
values on Tax Morale, it should be noted that the post-materialist value change 
hypothesis proposed by Ronald Inglehart (1971) was originally developed to explain 
individual value change among those living in the advanced industrial democracies of 
Western Europe, North America, and Asia which would broadly match the best scoring 
free countries in the Freedom in the World Survey. Therefore, the current set of results 
should be taken with some reservation because they include individuals from 
democracies in which the conditions that were envisioned in the original hypothesis – 
material needs satisfied by the development of the welfare state – are not met in several 
of those. Even with those reservations in mind, two observations may be made. First, the 
coefficient measuring an individual’s post-materialist values (the 12-item index 
developed by Inglehart and included in the WVS) shows the expected negative sign 
(higher post-materialist values decrease probability of individual reporting Tax Morale) 
and it is statistically significant (1 percent level). Second, the size of the impact seems to 
be small (as measured by the marginal effects); a one point increase in the level of post-
materialism decreases the probability of reporting Tax Morale by about 1 percentage 
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point which points out to an impact that is like the one linking Trust in the Civil Service 
and Tax Morale. 
To finish the presentation of the first set of results we will briefly review some of 
the remaining results that -to a great extent repeat those observed in earlier studies (those 
can be seen in the full tables in the appendix). Thus, Pride in one’s nationality – National 
Pride - positively affects Tax Morale (e.g. Torgler 2005a); one unit increase in national 
pride increases the probability of reporting Tax Morale by about 5 percentage points 
(holding all other independent variables at their means). Females are about 5 percent 
more likely to report Tax Morale than men (other variables constant at their means). 
Income is also associated with Tax Morale but in this case higher income makes 
individuals less likely to report Tax Morale; a similar result is observed regarding 
younger individuals compared to their older counterparts. Individual level of education 
also affects Tax Morale; individuals with no formal education and with elementary 
education are less likely to report Tax Morale than those with high school education 
(baseline group). By contrast, individuals with college education are indistinguishable in 
their Tax Morale from those of the baseline group. Single individuals are less likely to 
report Tax Morale than married ones, and talking about employment those who are 
retirees are more likely to report willingness to comply with their taxes compared with 
full-time individuals that are similar (average) on all other respects. 
While the results so far provide support for the proposed hypotheses, it is time to 
introduce the results of testing the same hypotheses on individuals from the group of part-
free and not free countries to see whether the results contradict or confirm the ones 
obtained in this section. 
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6.2 Individuals from Partial Free and Not Free Countries 
 
Although the results have provided support for the different hypotheses (to a 
varied extent) when tested with individuals living in countries where their rights and 
freedoms are for the most part established and effective. The broader question this section 
explores is whether those results would be affected when testing them with individuals 
living where individual rights and freedoms are compromised. 
Before proceeding with the results, it should be noted that if the limitations to 
individual rights and freedoms become important they may in turn compromise the 
validity of the answers provided to opinion surveys (such as the WVS. However, even in 
light of those potential issues, it is useful to explore the hypotheses in those contexts 
because projects of tax reform are being undertaken by those countries. Those reforms 
attempts - under the guidance and financing of international organizations – seek to 
reform tax systems and tax administrations in the mold of advanced countries; moreover, 
they aim to shape the relationship of taxpayers and tax authorities as one in which the 
former should be treated as customers and not subjects (e.g. World Bank 2008, pp. 28-29) 
which has also been the purpose of tax reform in Australia (Braithwaite, 2003a). Because 
developing countries seek to adopt the tax reforms undertaken in developed democracies, 
it may be useful to get a first glimpse regarding how differences in the levels of 
individual rights and freedoms may affect Tax Morale in ways different from those of the 
democratic countries. Table 6.3 presents the results of testing the hypotheses with 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Starting with the hypothesis of trust in government, the results differ a great deal 
from those coming from individuals in free countries. Notably, none of the variables we 
proposed to measure trust in the output side of government -Trust in Police and Trust in 
the Civil service –is statistically significant (both were statistically significant in the sub-
set of individuals from free countries). Moreover, unlike the earlier studies reviewed 
Trust in Parliament also failed to reach statistical significance. However, Trust in Justice 
is statistically significant at the five percent level shows the expected positive sign; from 
the marginal effects (column 10) one unit increase in trust increases the probability of 
reporting Tax Morale by close to two percent (columns 9 and 10) holding all other 
explanatory variables at their means. 
The results obtained seem to question the rationale behind the hypothesis that 
individuals form their evaluations of trust in government from the direct, face-to-face 
interaction with street level bureaucrats belonging to organization in the government’s 
output side. Although a country’s courts are part of the output side of government – they 
administer the policies decided by the political (input) side – because individuals are far 
more likely to interact with police forces or bureaucrats in the civil service the 
expectation was that those variables measuring trust in Police and the Civil Service to 
affect Tax Morale. Moreover, because the Freedom in the World Survey country ratings 
indicates that the situation of individual rights and freedoms for the countries considered 
here suggest that evaluations of trust in justice and courts would be not likely to come 
from direct experience with the judiciary or its performance. In order to better understand 
the latter point, it would be useful to illustrate by using one of the country reports that are 
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part of the yearly Freedom in the World Surveys. Specifically, I will introduce parts of 
the country report done for Turkey as part of the 2010 survey17. 
Turkey makes for a good illustration because its scores of individual rights and 
civil liberties are at the top of the range for what Freedom House considers partial free 
countries; other countries in this group perform considerably worse18. For instance, 
talking about the judiciary in Turkey, the report indicates, 
“…The constitution envisions an independent judiciary. The government 
in practice can influence judges through appointments, promotions, and 
financing ….the judiciary has been improved in recent years… however, 
Amnesty International has accused the Heavy Penal Courts of accepting 
evidence extracted under torture…” (Freedom House, 2010) 
 
Another interesting topic is the practical limitation in the freedom of expression 
rights. Although constitutionally guaranteed, Turkish citizens may be incarcerated and 
prosecuted for discussing issues such as the division of Cyprus, the 1915 mass killings of 
Armenians by Turks, or insulting the armed services A particularly insidious case 
involves legislation under which individuals may be incarcerated and prosecuted for 
denigrating “Turkishness” (quotes on original) (Freedom House, 2010). In other words, 
freedom of expression in Turkey (and by extension for the group of partial free countries) 
is a problematic right to exercise for individuals; although the rights exist on paper, the 
reality of their use is affected by other pieces of legislation or abuse and neglect of 
government officials. In turn, those developments might affect the extent to which 
individuals may respond faithfully to survey questions such as those from the World 
                                                 
 
 
17  Because the country ratings do not vary substantially from year to year, the choice of 2010 is as relevant 
as that of choosing an earlier year 
18 Incidentally, Turkey had sought membership to the European Union, which may indicate that even if the 
situation of individual rights and freedoms there was seen at least with potential for improvement. 
 119
Values Survey, thus adding an additional layer of complexity when interpreting empirical 
results. 
The situation illustrated by Freedom House’s report on Turkey and its 
implications for the other partial free countries suggest that individual evaluations of trust 
in justice and courts may hardly reflect individual assessments of fairness or performance 
for that institution. Moreover, other evaluations of trust in government may be affected 
by practical restrictions to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, those results have to be 
explained. One possibility is that statements of trust in justice would reflect individuals’ 
desire of being treated fairly by authorities. If that is indeed the case, it is remarkable that 
individuals hold a sense of fairness despite the experience of unfairness in their daily 
lives. Another possibility is that individuals avoid answering those questions they 
consider problematic (such as whether they trust the Police of public bureaucrats in the 
Civil Service) and instead give an answer of convenience. 
Turning now into the result for the second hypothesis - ideology - both variables 
measuring individuals’ ideological leanings - Income inequality and Individual 
responsibility - are statistically significant and thus associated with Tax Morale. 
However, Income Inequality shows the opposite sign (positive) to the one expected, 
meaning that, for those living in partial free and not free countries, viewing income 
inequalities in society as positive and useful are more likely to report Tax Morale than 
those who would prefer a more egalitarian income distribution. One possible explanation 
for the unexpected sign would be that those upholding more income distribution equality 
would be less likely to report Tax Morale if they dislike the current situation regarding 
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income inequality; their lower Tax Morale would be therefore a result of their 
unwillingness to support governments that fail to address the situation. 
In any event, the impacts of ideology on Tax Morale seem small. One point 
increase in preferring income inequality raises the probability of reporting Tax Morale by 
less than one percentage point (all other independent variables hold at their means). With 
regards to Individual Responsibility, an increase of one point decreases the probability of 
reporting Tax Morale by about 1.7 percentage points (holding all other variables to their 
means). Overall, the results suggest that individuals’ ideological beliefs have an effect on 
Tax Morale, although the relationship between ideological beliefs, and Tax Morale seems 
more complex than what we assumed since the ideological statements may also include 
some evaluation of the actual environment and not ideological beliefs in isolation. 
The results show that individual support for democracy increases the probability 
of reporting Tax Morale as expected. The coefficient for the variable is statistically 
significant at the one percent level, and has the expected positive sign; marginal effects 
also indicate that individuals who reject all of the non-democratic government 
alternatives are more likely to report Tax Morale by eight percentage points (column 10). 
At the same time, the results reveal that support of non-democratic regimes is not 
statistically associated with Tax Morale, while we expected that those who supported 
non-democratic regimes would be more likely to exhibit Tax Morale in this particular 
context. Because of the way the variable was set up, it made possible to gauge individual 
support for democratic or non-democratic government alternatives, although in the latter 
case it does not discriminate which non-democratic alternative the individual prefers. 
That might be an explanation for the observed result; the group of partial free and not free 
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countries has a wide array of political systems, ranking from electoral democracies with 
moderate to serious restrictions to individual exercise of rights and freedoms (Turkey as a 
case in point) to outright one-party dictatorships (e.g. Vietnam, China). It may be also 
possible that non-democratic regimes might not generate the degree of support among the 
population as to affect their willingness to comply with taxes. 
 Overall, the results obtained support the idea that those who reject non-democratic 
government alternatives are more likely to be unwilling to cheat on their taxes even when 
living in countries where democracy is generally absent. In any event, the proportion of 
individuals who support democracy in those countries is rather small as shown in Table 
6.2 (about 17 percent) so even in the case those countries would manage to transition into 
a full-fledged democracy the reservoir of support for democracy and the extent to which 
it may affect Tax Morale remains limited to a minority group in the population. 
Finally, the results for the fourth hypothesis will not be discusses because 
individuals living in those countries do not represent the environment where the post-
materialist value change hypothesis was developed. Perhaps predictably, given the 
mismatch between the hypothesis and the sample in which it is tested, the post-materialist 
value index is not statistically significant. 
I would now comment briefly on the results for other control variables included in 
the sample that are not pictured in Table 6.3 (due to space reasons, those results are 
available in the Appendix). Pride in one’s national origin affects Tax Morale in a positive 
way; one point increase in pride raises the probability of reporting Tax Morale by almost 
nine percentage points (column 10). By contrast, religiosity (measured as attendance to 
religious services) is not statistically significant in the full model (although it was so in 
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all the partial models). Interestingly, neither gender nor age was found to affect Tax 
Morale whereas reviewed studies found that females and elder people were more likely to 
report Tax Morale Education was also not statistically related to Tax Morale except for 
those with university education that were more likely to report Tax Morale than their 
high-school graduate counterparts (and average in all other respects). In line with earlier 
results, higher income individuals were less likely to report Tax Morale than their lower 
income counterparts (but otherwise average in all other respects). 
Overall, the results in Table 6.3 should be taken with some caution because of the 
political environment individuals face in those countries; the accuracy and faithfulness of 
their survey responses may suffer in unexpected ways as a result. First, trust in 
government affects Tax Morale positively, although the mechanism underlying it seems 
different from that of individuals in democratic (free) countries. Trust in government 
organizations that directly interact with taxpayers do not influence Tax Morale, whereas 
Trust in Justice does affect the likelihood of reporting Tax Morale in a positive way. 
Thus, there is either a different mechanism for eliciting individual trust in government in 
those countries, or the condition of political rights and civil liberties there affect the 
extent to which survey respondents provide trustworthy answers to the questions 
presented to them. 
Second, ideological beliefs do affect Tax Morale, but the results suggest a more 
complex relationship than hypothesized. For instance, if an individual’s preference for 
income inequality is such that he accepts only small differences, to the extent that he 
perceives large income inequalities his Tax Morale may be lower than that of those 
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preferring large income differences; he may be unwilling to support a government that 
does nothing to address those issues. 
Third, support for democracy drives Tax Morale. Although the results confirm 
those already available in the Tax Morale literature, there are a few differences. The use 
of a different measure to avoid the shortcomings of measures of overt support for 
democracy is one of those differences. The second differences resides in the fact that the 
measure used here also allowed to test a broader proposition, namely that individual 
support for a given political regime would affect reported Tax Morale if the preferred 
regime was the one actually in place; this last proposition failed to receive empirical 
support. 
Fourth, the results regarding the influence on post-materialist values on Tax 
Morale (specifically, the lack of empirical support) may not be surprising because the 
environment in which it has been tested differs substantially from the one for which the 
hypothesis of post-materialist values was developed. 
Now it is the turn of introducing the last set of results for individuals living in the 
best-scoring free countries (according to the Freedom House Survey) which will provide 
for an additional test in a narrower set of free countries, and also allow for testing the 
proposition that upholding post-materialist values may affect Tax Morale. 
 
6.3. Tax Morale in advanced democracies 
 
Table 6.4 presents the results for individuals living in the best scoring countries 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The main goal is finding if post-materialist values influence Tax Morale in the 
same setting – advanced democracies both politically and economically – in which the 
post-materialist value change hypothesis was developed. –The results plainly show that 
upholding post-materialist values has no effect on Tax Morale - the coefficient lacks 
statistical significance. One obvious explanation for the results would be that there is no 
common cause behind low trust in political institutions and low Tax Morale. Even though 
there are studies that find a relationship between low trust in political institutions and a 
process of value change with empirical evidence going back to the 1960s, there is no 
similar evidence for checking the evolution of Tax Morale over time. Some also question 
whether post-materialism constitutes a real value dimension (Davis, Dowley, and Silver, 
1999) 
Second, if the process of value change has slowed down in recent years there 
would be little difference in values for individuals of different generations; indeed, 
Inglehart (2008) noted that value change has become slower in the 2000s when compared 
with the first observations of the phenomenon (Inglehart, 1971). 
There are also concerns regarding the consistency of the measure used to gauge 
post-materialist values. Davis and Davenport (1999) reviewed the literature on post-
materialist values and contended that the measures used (the 4-item index or the 12-item 
index) could be sensitive to the economic environment, yielding higher post-materialism 
at times of economic bonanza and lower post-materialism when unemployment is high. 
Inglehart and Abramson (1999) in turn countered that even after controlling for economic 
factors there is evidence of value shift towards post-materialist ones. In the present case, 
had the post-materialist values measure been affected by the economic cycle, the results 
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would have been biased towards a positive relationship between post-materialist values 
and Tax Morale because the economy was expansionary during most of the period in 
which the WVS was collected. In any event, further work is necessary in order to sort out 
those issues and identify – by examining the post-materialist literature in further depth – 
specific aspect of individual values and attitudes that may affect Tax Morale. 
Examination of other results reveals some similarities and differences compared 
with the group of free countries estimated earlier. For instance, the results for the trust in 
government variables are mostly similar to those of the free countries; Trust in Civil 
Service is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and one point increase in trusting 
it increases the probability of reporting Tax Morale by about two percentage points. 
Similarly, Trusting Police also increases the probability of reporting Tax Morale. One 
point increase in trust in police raises the probability of reporting that cheating on taxes is 
never justified by about 4 percentage points; the coefficient is statistically significant at 
the one percent level. Those results confirm that Tax Morale is driven by individuals’ 
evaluation of government legitimacy when exercising power over the citizenry, which 
happens at the time individuals interact with street level bureaucrats to receive their share 
of public goods and services (Rothstein, 2005, 2009, Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). 
One result for the Trust in Government variables is different, however. Trust in 
Parliament, that was previously not statistically significant is now so at the one percent 
level, but the sign of the effect is actually the opposite compared to earlier studies. It may 
be possible to claim lower trust in Parliaments would reflect higher individual attachment 
to the system, as citizens scrutinize the work of political institutions in detail never 
granting a blank check. Although feasible, measuring Trust in Parliament is also open to 
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conflicting interpretations; Citrin (1974) observed that measures of trust in Parliaments 
might measure either trust in its incumbents, trust in the institution, or capture something 
else. In turn, his interpretation suggests that trust in political institutions may be more 
questionable in terms of what they effectively measure. 
With regards to the hypothesis linking ideology with Tax Morale, none of the 
proposed measures for individuals’ ideology show a statistically significant relationship 
with reported Tax Morale. Perhaps ideological differences between what is “left” and 
“right” may not be as relevant for individuals in this particular group of countries. New 
forms of political participation (including direct democracy), declines in voter turnout, 
and party affiliation, are transforming those representative democracies into advocacy 
democracies (Dalton, Scarrow, and Cain, 2004). Thus, it may be possible that ideological 
cleavages are getting eroded and become less important. 
Alternatively, other measures may be better at capturing individuals’ ideological 
leanings. For instance, Wahlund (1992) studied the determinants of tax evasion among 
Swedish subjects and found that party support – his measure for ideology - explained tax 
evasion; individuals supporting conservative parties evaded more taxes than those 
supporting liberal ones19. 
The impact of individual support for democracy – measured as rejecting non-
democratic government alternatives – has remained unaltered. The effect is positive; 
                                                 
 
 
19 Developing that measure in a multi-country setting would have involved arranging about 50 political 
parties along the left-right continuum for the 13 countries that are part of the best scoring democracies 
alone. A further expansion to cover all of the free countries would have demanded to arrange the political 
party systems of 29 countries along the same left-right continuum. That was the main reason for pursuing 
more readily available measures of individual ideology. 
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rejecting all non-democratic government alternatives increases probability of reporting 
Tax Morale by seven percentage points; the coefficient is statistically significant at the 
one percent level. One thing to note is that the size of the impact is broadly similar 
whether we consider all free countries, the smaller subset of the best scoring 
democracies, or the partial free and not free countries. The results suggest that democracy 
generates a degree of support not only from the population exposed to them – case of free 
countries – and it also exerts attraction for the minorities in partial free and not free 
countries that reject non-democratic regime alternatives. 
 Other results (available in the appendix) show that national pride and religiosity 
positively affect Tax Morale. Similarly, females, and older individuals are more likely to 
report Tax Morale than males and younger ones. Higher incomes are associated with 
lower probability of reporting Tax Morale but the impact is small. 
The next section will introduce an additional test, running the same models ran 
earlier but with a different specification for the dependent variable to see the impact on 
the results already obtained. 
 
6.4. Comparison between Probit and Ordered Probit 
 
Tax Morale has been measured so far as a binary yes-no because all values above 
1 (cheating on taxes never justifiable) justified cheating. In order to check whether the 
results are not affected by the chosen form of the dependent variable, the original 10-
point scale included in the World Values Survey will be used instead. To make results’ 
comparison easier the only transformation in the variable would be changing the direction 
of the variable so higher values mean higher Tax Morale. Table 6.5 introduces the results 
 129
for the full binary Probit models presented earlier versus the ordered Probit models 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results are grouped by level of political rights and civil liberties - – all free 
countries, partial free and not-free countries, and best scoring free countries (also called 
advanced democracies). Overall, three of the hypotheses show no changes regardless of 
the specification of the dependent variable. 
The results for the first hypothesis - trust in government organizations of the 
output side and Tax Morale - are consistent across the binomial and ordinal regressions. 
The only difference comes from Trust in Parliament in the best scoring free countries 
sample. Although statistically significant in the model using the binomial dependent 
variable, it is not statistically significant in the alternate ordinal Probit model. 
Likewise, the results for the hypotheses dealing with the role of ideology and 
support for political regimes on Tax Morale do not change regardless of how the 
dependent variable is defined. Where ideology appeared as statistical significant (free and 
partial-free plus not free countries) has remained so. Results regarding Support for 
democracy - rejection for non-democratic government alternatives – have also remained 
statistically significant; only support for democracy raises Tax Morale. 
The only substantial difference concerns the post-materialist value hypothesis. 
Using the original 10-point scale dependent variable, the coefficient for post-materialist 
values has a positive (rather than negative) influence on Tax Morale, being statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. Unlike expectations, higher levels of post-materialist 
values appear associated with higher Tax Morale. However, the result is consistent with 
the criticism that measures of post-materialist values are affected by the economic cycle –
economies in expansion would tilt individuals towards post-materialist values since 
materialistic ones are less of a concern. The results are far from definitive so if additional 
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exploration of this hypothesis is desired, a more detailed review of the literature for 
modified or customized measures of post-materialist values would be necessary. 
Table 6.5 also reports some of the additional explanatory variables (the rest may 
be consulted in the appendix tables) Many of those independent variables are not affected 
by the change of specification for the dependent variable; that is the case of national 
pride, gender, age, and income. Religiosity, education level, marital status, and 
employment status, show a few differences but keep many similarities. Overall, the 
theoretical underpinnings of the model do not seem to be affected a big deal by changes 




It is time to summarize the results obtained from testing the four hypotheses. 
First, the evidence on trust in government being driven by the actions of government 
organizations in the output side is solid when considering individuals living under 
democratic regimes (the “free” category of the Freedom in the World survey). The same 
results held when testing among individuals living in the best performing democracies in 
terms of upholding political rights and civil liberties (those with Freedom House scores 
of 1). In contrast, trust in justice – a government’s organization of the output side – has 
not been statistically significant, which may be attributed to taxpayers being less likely to 
have direct exposure to courts - at least when compared to the exposure to Police forces 
and bureaucrats in the civil service. 
Trust in political organizations (in this case, Parliament) appear to play a lesser 
role in shaping Tax Morale than what earlier studies’ result suggest; it was not 
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statistically significant for the “free” countries model and statistically significant - but 
with a negative impact on Tax Morale – when tested among those living in the best 
scoring Free countries, result that contradicts findings from previous studies. Testing 
among individuals from partial free and not-free countries, by contrast, showed no impact 
for all the trust variables but for the Justice and Courts trust variable. The explanation of 
that particular result is difficult, but because of the information provided by the Freedom 
House survey we know that the performance of the judiciary in those countries is far 
from satisfactory (e.g. tolerance for torture of prisoners, application of vague laws that 
criminalize individuals’ freedom of expression, and so on). Overall, the findings are 
consistent among those living under established and functional democratic regimes. 
 Support for the relationship between ideology and Tax Morale shows an almost 
opposite pattern compared to that of the first hypothesis. Ideology influences Tax Morale 
among those living in partial free and not free countries, although one of the variables 
showed the opposite sign to what was predicted. For individuals living among the best 
scoring democracies, by contrast, it seems that ideological beliefs play no role in shaping 
individual Tax Morale. For those living in free countries only one of the measures 
showed statistical significance. However, whenever ideology was found to affect Tax 
Morale, the size of the impacts was very small. 
 The influence of support for democracy on Tax Morale has held across the 
different environments to which it was tested. Although those results are not new, two 
things have to be highlighted. First, individual support for democracy was measured 
using a different instrument that emerged out of the limitations of measures of overt 
support for democracy (Inglehart, 2003). Second, what is perhaps more surprising is the 
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relative stability of its impact among individuals living in different political regimes –
marginal effects in the order of seven to eight percent for the three different samples for 
which the model was run. 
 Finally, the evidence for a link between upholding post-materialist values and Tax 
Morale seems mixed. On the one hand, under the binary specification for the explanatory 
variable, there is no statistical impact of post-materialist values on Tax Morale. When the 
original WVS variable that measures Tax Morale is used, however, the variable is 
statistically significant but with an opposite sign to what was expected. Given the scarce 
evidence regarding the relevance of post-materialist values on economic matters, and the 
concerns about the validity of the measures used to gauge it, it seems that additional 








7.1. Trust in Government 
 
The results for the “free” countries support the hypothesis that Tax Morale is 
affected by the actions of government organizations in the output side when interacting 
with taxpayers in the delivery of public goods and services. Conversely, the evidence for 
the effect of trust in political organizations – Parliaments - on Tax Morale (previously 
found to be statistically significant and positive) has not been supported. Moreover, 
higher trust in Parliaments was found to negatively influence Tax Morale when tested 
among those living in the best scoring free countries (advanced democracies). 
Those results do not preclude that trust in government may be driven on certain 
cases by political leadership; a charismatic leader may help boost citizen commitment to 
a nascent democracy (Levi, 1998). Over time, however, the basic mechanism –trust in 
government is the result of individuals direct experience of fair treatment received from 
officials on the output side of government –would provide the main thrust of trust in 
government. 
The results suggest that if governments want to increase taxpayer willingness to 
comply with taxes – Tax Morale – they should extend to other government organizations 
that interact with citizens what the tax compliance literature recommends for tax 
administrations; building a relationship of trust between them and the tax authorities by 
treating them fairly (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007) Specifically, treat individuals 
with respect, apply procedures and rules consistently across individuals, give them voice 
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in the agency’s procedures, among others. Those recommendations fall along the lines of 
what has been known as principles of procedural justice (Tyler, 1988), or more recently, 
by treating individuals with impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008) defined as treating 
everybody without any preconceived ideas or biases. 
The recommendations for partial free and not-free countries seem less clear 
because of the results obtained when testing among individuals from countries in those 
categories. Unlike the case of free countries, only the measure of Trust in Justice 
appeared positively affecting individual Tax Morale. However, because of the precarious 
situation about political rights and civil liberties, it is difficult to justify those results as 
consequence of the judiciary’s good performance, a possibility that has been already 
discussed. 
Even with those issues in mind, I would suggest that a similar recommendation – 
build a relationship of trust between taxpayers and authorities across the public sector – is 
still applicable based on evidence (to be introduced shortly) indicating that individuals 
respond positively to signals of trust. What it is unclear, however, is how to effectively 
implement that recommendation in places where the rights and freedoms that make such 
treatment possible are undermined. In those countries, taxpayers as individuals have 
limited rights and what is being proposed requires those rights to be enhanced and upheld 
by the same authorities that fail (either by impossibility or disinterest) to uphold them. 
A legitimate question is whether doing those things would actually increase tax 
compliance given the concerns raised by Halla (2010) regarding the still underdeveloped 
links between tax compliance attitudes and behavior already addressed in earlier chapters. 
In response to that, there is evidence that linking average levels of tax evasion with the 
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size of the underground economy (Alm and Torgler, 2006). At the individual level, recent 
experimental evidence indicates that individuals recognize signals of trust or mistrust 
received and react accordingly (for a review, see Fehr, Fischbacher and Kosfeld, 2005); 
unlike earlier experiments where only behavior is recorded, those new experiments also 
register subjects’ physiological parameters (e.g. brain activity imaging, level of neuro-
chemicals). 
Zak, Kurzban, and Matzner (2005) found that subjects that receive a signal of 
trust – a monetary transfer from a partner - experience an increase in a compound – 
oxytocin – that has been found to promote social interaction in animals and facilitates 
mother-child bonding after birth in humans. Those individuals were more likely to 
respond positively to the trust signal received by transferring back higher amounts to 
their partners. Interestingly, oxytocin may help promoting cooperation but does not 
induce gullible behavior. Individuals who have received the substance still withheld 
cooperation when they were in the presence of a partner that seems untrustworthy in the 
same way as the control group exposed to placebo (Mikolajczak et al., 2010). 
Conversely, individuals respond in kind when they receive signals of distrust from a third 
party. Zak et al. (2005) found that distrust signals also trigger a physiological reaction 
that make individuals more likely to punish the mistrusting party; in the experiment’s 
case, individuals who received low offers in the ultimatum game were more likely to 
reject them. Overall, experimental results give additional support for the recommendation 
that treating taxpayers with respect would increase the probability that they would 
reciprocate the treatment and comply with their taxes voluntarily. They also suggest that 
unfair treatment at the hand of authorities would make individuals more likely to 
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reciprocate in kind by abstaining to pay their taxes voluntarily. Further experiments may 




The results of testing the influence of ideological beliefs on Tax Morale have 
shown less conclusive results. Among those living in free countries, only one of the 
measures gauging ideology showed the expected negative effect on Tax Morale. In the 
case of those living in partial free and not free countries, both measures showed statistical 
significance but one exhibited a direction of effect opposite to theoretical expectations. In 
all cases, however, the size of those effects was noticeably small. Finally, ideology failed 
to show any impact on Tax Morale among those living in the best scoring of the free 
countries (what is also known as advanced democracies). To the extent that the proposed 
measures of individuals’ ideology may accurately tap into those beliefs, it seems that 
there is little impact of ideology on Tax Morale. It may be possible, however, that other 
measures may better measure taxpayers’ ideology. 
A strict interpretation of results allows exploring what would be the policy 
implications of the impact of ideology on Tax Morale. It seems that governments may 
have little chance of changing ideological beliefs among the population in the same way 
they may not influence religious beliefs. As a result, ideology may be seen as a parameter 
to be considered in policy formulation, either facilitating or impeding policy 
implementation regarding tax compliance. A case in point can be made regarding public 
finance reform during the democratic transition in the 1970s and 1980s in Spain. A 
substantial reform of the public sector including tax administration and new taxes (such 
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as VAT) were implemented with one result being a considerable increase in tax 
collections and a similar increase in government expenditures. The reform may have been 
facilitated by Spaniards’ attitudes that were supportive of government action to reduce 
social inequality and ameliorate economic crisis (McDonough Barnes and Lopez Pina, 
1998, p. 72). Conversely, if government policies in the area of taxation are seen as 
undermining values such as a belief in individual responsibility and overcoming 
inequalities with one’s effort rather than the government’s (as it would be the case with a 
progressive income tax) it may affect Tax Morale negatively among those who uphold 
such beliefs. Prospective work in the area of ideology should include a re-evaluation of 
alternative measures of ideological beliefs in order to engage in further testing. 
 
7.3 Support for Political Regimes 
 
The situation regarding support for political regimes and how it may affect policy 
formulation has to be discussed separately, depending on the type of political regime 
under consideration. 
Talking about democratic regimes, the results support the finding that individual 
support for democracy increases Tax Morale among those preferring democratic regimes 
over non-democratic ones, a finding that has held regardless of the sub-sample under 
consideration (free countries, partial free plus not free, or best scoring free countries). For 
those living in free countries where democracy runs reasonably well, individual attitudes 
towards democracy may be affected by direct experience with democracy and some of it 
s values – especially tolerance. However, it may be the case that support for democracy is 
built during the individual’s formation years like post-materialist values; if that is the 
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case, government performance may matter less in the short run but instead matter for 
younger generations to be raised and socialized in a democratic environment. 
Still, the results obtained allow for some degree of inference regarding policy 
formulation. First, newly established democracies may not expect that support for 
democracy would help in eliciting voluntary tax compliance among the population; the 
proportion of individuals who support democracy would be a minority of the population, 
as Inglehart (2003) insights suggested. 
The second part concerns whether non-democratic political regimes may elicit 
voluntary tax compliance among their supporters; the results provided no support to that 
proposition. It may be that the measure chosen did not capture support for those regimes. 
However, in light of the experimental results reviewed earlier in the chapter, I believe the 
results reflect the inability of non-democratic regimes of generating a climate of trust and 
cooperation between authorities and taxpayers. For instance, restrictions to individual 
rights and freedoms may be read by the population as a sign that authorities do not trust 
them, which may undermine taxpayers’ willingness to comply with taxes. That raises the 
question of whether tax policies aimed to create a climate of trust and cooperation 
between authorities and taxpayers may succeed in such an environment. North (1994) 
discussed the same issue, namely whether institutional transplant had a chance for 
success; he was skeptical, 
“…economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have 
very different performance characteristics than the first economy because 
of different informal norms and enforcement…transferring the formal 
political and economic rules of successful Western market economies to 
third world and Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition 
for good economic performance…” (p. 366) 
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In the case of tax administration reform, trust and cooperation between taxpayers 
and authorities requires that both parties have the same standing. In the partial free and 
not free countries, authorities have the upper hand; individual rights and freedoms in 
those countries are either formally curtailed, informally unenforced, or both. Therefore, 
tax reforms based on models implemented in developed democracies may not produce 
the same results when implemented in countries where the underlying conditions are 
different from those of the originating countries. 
 
7.4 Post-Materialist Values 
 
The results obtained are inconclusive regarding the influence of post-materialist 
affecting Tax Morale. The first set of results revealed that there is no statistically 
significant impact; however, using the ordinal variable for measuring Tax Morale 
included in the World Values Survey showed a positive (rather than negative) 
relationship between upholding post-materialist values and Tax Morale. A positive 
relationship between upholding post-materialist values and Tax Morale is feasible. The 
most developed democracies offer their citizens more avenues to provide direct input in 
policymaking – e.g. referenda and petitions –that those upholding post-materialist values 
prefer. Taxpayers may respond by becoming more willing to comply with their taxes. 
One counter-argument has been already offered, namely that in light of controversy 
regarding the measure to gauge individuals’ post-materialist values, a booming economy 
would yield a result consistent to the one obtained in the second set of results. Further 
work may be necessary to determine the impact of post-materialist values on Tax Morale 
along the lines of assessing the theoretical and empirical relevance of the concept. 
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Likewise, policy implications would have to wait further work on the topic. However, if 
the basic theoretical underpinnings hold true – individual values are acquired during the 
formation years and remain the same afterwards, governments may only take notice of 
the conditions imposed by post-materialist values when drafting tax policy. 
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 The tables included in the appendix are the more complete versions of the results 
tables included in Chapter 6. Table A.1 presents the results for individuals living in Free 
countries and corresponds to Table 6.1. Table A.2 presents the results for individuals 
living in Partial Free and Not Free countries (same as in Table 6.3). Table A.3 presents 
the results for individuals living in the best scoring democracies (Table 6.4), and Table 
A.4 compares the results of the previous Probit models with Ordered Probit models 
(Table 6.5). Results do not include the country dummy variables, and in the case of Table 
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